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ABSTRACT

The United States is a remarkably religious nation. It is inevitable that clinical social
workers will encounter clients whose self understanding has been shaped, or impacted, troubled
and or soothed by their faith. Our religiously minded clients need us to be able to speak to the
questions of deep meaning their faiths challenge and answer. Yet, we are not clergy. We have a
different and important role. Moreover we may be atheists ourselves. In addition we live in a
religiously pluralistic country. There is no single faith language that can accommodate all
religious people. Even if a social worker were able to speak a given faith with eloquence they
could not hope to be equally articulate in all religions. Fortunately, there are theories in the
psychoanalytic tradition that will allow the social worker to frame questions of deep meaning in
a way that will resonate with religiously concerned clients while preserving the essentially non
religious character of our clinical work. This thesis is a cross-disciplinary approach utilizing
particular theology and psychodynamic theories toward working with religious clients.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In a moment of post-Enlightenment atheistic confidence, Sigmund Freud predicted that
the increase of scientific knowledge would inexorably lead to the death of religion. In a 1909
letter to Carl Jung he wrote, “The more the fruits of knowledge become accessible to men, the
more widespread is the decline of religious belief” (Freud, 1909/1977, p.13). Yet in the United
States, Freud’s assumption has been disproved. The United States continues to be a remarkably
religious nation: according to sociologist Robert Putnam 36% of Americans worship at least
once a week (Putnam, 2000). To place this percentage in global context it is interesting to
consider that this is a slightly higher percentage than that of Iran; a theocracy. Moreover, studies
repeatedly show that more than 80% of adult Americans claim to believe in God (Putnam, 2012).
Given these statistics, it is inevitable that clinical social workers will encounter clients whose
self-understanding, family dynamics and other inter-personal relationships have all been shaped,
or at least impacted, by their faith.
Indeed, in my limited experience I have already met several clients whose faith troubles
and/or soothes them. Examples include, but are not limited to a fourteen year old girl struggling
to reconcile her sexual orientation with her membership in a strict, homophobic church that she
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loved and a Pentecostal woman who understood her recovery from childhood sexual abuse as an
act of “renouncing Satan.”
These and other experiences suggest that in order to best help our clients, social workers
should be familiar with their religious perspectives. In prior generations, some strains of
psychotherapy recognized the need for their practitioners to be religiously conversant. In a
famous rejoinder to Freud, Carl Jung put it bluntly:
During the past thirty years, people from all the civilized countries of the earth
have consulted me. I have treated many hundreds of patients. … Among all my patients
in the second half of life — to say, over thirty-five — there has not been one whose
problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to
say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of
every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did
not regain his religious outlook (Jung, 1938/1966, p.17).
However, the Jungian attitude stood in sharp relief to what was emerging as the
psychoanalytic community's predominant take on religion. Freud typified this perspective with
these words:
Our knowledge of the historical worth of certain religious doctrines increases our
respect for them, but does not invalidate our proposal that they should cease to be put
forward as the reasons for the precepts of civilization. On the contrary! Those historical
residues have helped us to view religious teachings, as it were, as neurotic relics, and we
may now argue that the time has probably come, as it does in an analytic treatment, for
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replacing the effects of repression by the results of the rational operation of the intellect
(Freud, 1927/2010 p 44).
As the years went by Freud’s rhetoric grew more heated and became sharpened:
The whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a
friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will
never be able to rise above this view of life. It is still more humiliating to discover how a
large number of people living today, who cannot but see how this religion is not tenable,
nevertheless try to defend it by piece in a series of pitiful reargued actions (Freud,
1930/1961, p.3).
The psychoanalytic community of Freud's day articulated not only a fundamentally
atheistic stance toward religion, but an antagonistic one. They were not neutral but anti religion,
assuming that their work and insights would help a suffering humanity outgrow the religious
illusions that plagued us. These origins create an ongoing antipathy toward the topic of faith in
the life of an individual. Freud’s life work and perspective was subsumed into the training of
mental health professionals the world over. It undergirds most contemporary training in the field
of psychology. Of course we study the critique of pure Freudianism as we educate ourselves on
the context it unfolded within. Yet training today is still rooted in Freud’s original theories. The
other bodies of theory often presented in psychological training find their starting points with
Freud, attachment theory and object relations theory hold onto the core Freudian concepts of a
intrapsychic conflict and the unconscious mind.
Jung, on the other hand, is rarely mentioned in an MSW course of study. To become a
Jungian a mental health practitioner must augment their formal education with further study at an
approved Jungian institute. The fact that Jung’s concern to incorporate a religious/spiritual
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dimension into psychotherapy resulted in his school of thought being separated out from
mainstream psychological training seems indicative of our field’s leeriness about the subject.
Indeed, it seems safe to say that contemporary social workers may be inclined to ignore
the religious dimension of the client’s trouble, whether this trouble is rooted in discord in
relationships, a sense of isolation or an experience of meaninglessness. Of course these can all be
spiritual issues as well. The problem for social workers arises when a client's issues are
expressed in explicitly religious terms. The spiritual but not religious individuals are permitted to
express a vague religiosity, but those who hew closely to particular faith traditions most likely
will leave social workers flummoxed. When Jesus or karma or the Koran enter the room social
workers may find themselves veering away, unprepared for such conversation and unnerved by
its necessity.
Other Complicating Factors
Because the training clinical social workers receive grew out of Freudian schools of
knowledge, Freud’s anti-religious bias continues to affect contemporary social work’s attitude
toward faith. However, Freud is not the only factor at play here. Social work aims to meet
clients where they are and practices a radically egalitarian approach to human difference. The
National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics states plainly that “Social workers treat
each person in a caring and respectful fashion, mindful of individual differences and cultural and
ethnic diversity” (NASW, 2008). Meanwhile, many religiously sanctioned efforts to help the
needy have limited their scope include only people who share similar religious convictions and
ethnic or national backgrounds. I live in the city of Chicago. In my immediate neighborhood
there is a social service provider that began as a church orphanage aimed exclusively at the
children of deceased German speaking immigrants. Two and a half miles west of my home there
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is a hospital that was founded to care for what it calls “Norwegian American Lutherans”. To this
very day, the largest emergency shelter in the city is a fundamentalist Christian agency that
refuses care to those who will not first participate in a mandatory Christian prayer service.
It is difficult for social work to reconcile itself with such exclusive practices and purposes.
Motivated by an admirable impulse toward inclusion Social Work has grown averse to the
teachings and practices of particular religions, particularly those related to women and sexuality
that are viewed as exclusivist or in stark contrast to professional codes that emphasize dignity of
the individual.
A more recent phenomenon that both expresses and compounds this foundational
objection is the fact that as GLBT people and their allies have worked to make civil rights
advances, the majority voices in American religion have responded with an institutional official
homophobia that is both aggressive and bellicose. Twenty five percent of Americans are Roman
Catholic. The official Catholic teaching on homosexuality labels GLBT sexual acts “intrinsically
disordered.” The catechism goes on to say, “They [homosexual acts] are contrary to the natural
law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective
and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved.” (Cathecism of the
Roman Catholic Church, 2006). After Catholicism the second largest religious group in the
United States is the Southern Baptist Convention. The SBC may be smaller than the Catholic
Church, but is equally clear in its official condemnation of GLBT people. “Homosexuality is not
a ‘valid alternative lifestyle.’ The Bible condemns it as sin.” (Southern Baptist Convention,
2013)
Such teaching betrays a woefully outdated understanding of human sexuality. Rather than
recognizing that sexual orientation is given not chosen, the Catholics and Baptists regard
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homosexual acts as deviations from a non-existent but morally preferable universal norm.
According to both of these churches homosexuality is to heterosexuality as a lie is to the truth.
Social Work has long stood at the forefront of the struggle for equality for oppressed groups. Is it
any wonder we would recoil from a worldview that stands in direct opposition to what has been
called “the Civil Rights struggle of our time?” As I will suggest below, we are growing
increasingly comfortable with the broader concept of spirituality. But, we remain uncomfortable
when a person’s spirituality is articulated through or created by a given religion. Yet, despite our
historical opposition to religion rooted in Freudian thought, professional conflicts with its narrow
method of delivering care, and our contemporary apprehension about its politics, many clients
remain religious.
This leaves the social worker in an odd bind. Our religiously minded clients need us to be
able to speak to the questions of deep meaning their faiths both instigate and answer. Yet, we are
not clergy and most of us do not want to be. We have a different and important role. Moreover,
we may be atheists ourselves. In addition, we live in a religiously pluralistic country. There is no
single faith language that can accommodate all religious people. Even if a particular social
worker were able to speak a given faith with eloquence they could not hope to be equally
articulate in all religions.
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A Cross-Disciplinary Approach
Fortunately, we are a profession that draws from a multitude of theories. In addition, I
assert that there are theories in common use in social work that will allow the social worker to
frame questions of deep meaning in a way that will resonate with religiously concerned patients
while preserving the essentially non-religious character of our clinical work. In this theoretical
thesis I will aim to develop a cross-disciplinary conversation between Protestant Christian
theology and two theories used in social work treatment: existential and object relations. My aim
is not to argue that psychological theory is in itself somehow inadequate to the task before it.
Rather, I want to suggest that our ways of understanding both our own work and the realities our
clients are living in could be galvanized if we were to use discrete pieces of Christian theology,
or other religion’s conceptualizations to shed light on the struggles our clients’ experience. I will
argue that unless we are trained and prepared to facilitate such conversation, when the topic
arises we will be left unable to best serve the religious people who need our help.
Conceptualization and Methodology
This study will aim to “integrate disparate theoretical constructs” (Smith College School
for Social Work, 2013) I will compare existential theory and British object relations theory in an
effort toward practical integration to serve the troubled religiously minded individual by
examining how a specific religious theory might dialogue with these psychological theories. In
the following chapter, I will begin by describing the phenomena of the limited intersection of
religion and social work. I will explore this intersection from a historic, political and
professional viewpoint concentrating initially on those forces that have divided our field from its
original connection to religion.
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I will then provide an overview of the split between the practice of secular therapy and
pastoral counseling. The latter now accounts for over three million hours annually of therapy.
This overview will attempt to hold in view the early faith-related divisions in the field and the
way those divisions gave shape to the developing landscape of the profession.
I will then offer an evaluation of the contemporary context for the divide. This will be
explored by looking at current clinicians' attitudes toward religious content utilizing data from a
meta analysis of over 200 studies. This section will include attention to discourse among
practitioners and social work faculty involved in the training of future clinicians, who integrate
these questions at their varied institutions. I will propose a methodological solution for bridging
the divide as offered by Lindbeck (1984) who posits religion as individuals’ learned attempts at
meaning making. By comparing theological and psychological theories I will be attempting to
answer the question, can our multitheoretical profession incorporate theological understandings
into our psychological underpinnings to better understand and work with our religiously minded
clients
Discussion will them move from a look at the phenomenon as it expresses itself currently,
into exploration of how a particular theological doctrine dialogues with some of social work's
seminal theoretical frameworks. This exploration is ordered around the theologian Paul Tillich's
formulation of sin. Tillich, an eminent philosophical theologian of the midcentury worked to put
liberal Protestantism into discourse with existentialism. He asserted that the Protestant definition
of sin was best understood as a tri-fold separation. This is separation from other, separation from
self, and separation from what he called: the Ground of all Being. There exists a crackling field
of intersection, concert and contradiction between this person centered theology and
psychological theories.
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In the remaining chapters of the thesis I will compare and contrast these ideas in the
following manner: I will explore the Tillichian concept of tri-fold separation through the work
and thought of two eminent British object relations theorists. The first will be psychoanalyst
Melanie Klein. Klein's writing offers a language for the contradictory instinctual forces that draw
us into, and exile us from intimacy with others. Included in this chapter we will explore the
concept of tri-fold separation through the work of Heinz Kohut. Kohut's theory of Self
Psychology provides a necessary foundation to explore separation from self. The internal
structures of the self named in Self Psychology convey the vast depth to which separation is
struggled with in the human psyche.
I will explore the concept of separation from the Ground of all Being through the work
of Irwin Yalom. Yalom was among a handful of psychotherapists in the nineteen-seventies to
draw on the theoretical ties between psychotherapeutic practice and the philosophy of being.
Yalom's exposition of existential psychotherapy is embedded with humanity's protestations
against meaninglessness. Meaninglessness is survived, succumbed to and transcended by
humanity. There is rich opportunity here for correspondence with the Tillichian formulation of
the Protestant doctrine of sin.
The thesis will conclude with a discussion chapter on the strength and weakness of
utilizing the formulation of tri-fold separation with psychodynamic and existentialist theory to
develop a cross disciplinary knowledge base from which social workers might approach
religiously minded individuals from a protestant background.
Biases and Limitations
As is sometimes the case with investigation in the social sciences there is great overlap between
the areas of researcher bias and strength. This author identifies as a liberal protestant. Any and

	
  

9

all interpretation of the theology, practice and religion in this paper are through the lens of an
explicitly observant religious individual. This has been a strength in terms of accessing the
theology which in many ways reflects my own belief system. This fact may be construed also as
a limitation in that I have a personal investment in bridging the world of religion and
psychotherapy. I am coming from a place of hopefulness that this discussion can contribute and
enrich our work with religious clients. My familiarity with the theology of Paul Tillich, due to in
part to my personal faith life, also holds within it reservations regarding Christology. Tillich is
regarding by critics and admirers alike as espousing an apologist theology. Many of his critics
assert that in order to participate in the discourse of secular philosophy and existential thought he
watered down Christianity, reducing its truth claims to the point that his interpretations of them
hold very little that is distinctly Christian.
Tillich’s low Christology may be a vulnerability toward my aims if I were writing from
the standpoint of a pastoral counselor, but my secular training perspective liberates me from
concern with the truth claims of his work. It is precisely this characteristic that makes his work
flexible enough to work well with a broad range of Christian clients. My clinical training has
been intentionally secular, I have no desire to tell someone how, what or who to think of
religiously. But if an individual has a religious background it is neglectful to ignore it. This thesis
has been limited in scope toward individuals who identify as liberal protestant Christian. Its
purview would not include individuals with other religious identities. It could serve as one
example of how to evaluate how religious thought or theology is both sympathetic to, and
divergent from psychodynamic theories. Both areas of contrast and concert are relevant to
treating the religious client
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CHAPTER II
Phenomenon and Methodology
The Phenomenon
Those trained in secular institutions may take it as a given that Social Work does not
make much room for religion. In this chapter I will explore why this is the case. I will begin by
naming a fact that may surprise contemporary practitioners. At its inception our field was closely
tied to established religion in America. I will then attempt to trace the separation that took place,
taking pains to observe that this separation happened due to seemingly admirable reasons and
larger historic forces. I will briefly address the rapprochement between social work and faith
that took place in the 1960’s when spirituality became uncoupled from religion. I will then
consider how the reduction in government spending on social welfare that took place when
President Johnson’s Great Society began to be dismantled affected Social Work’s attitude toward
the politically conservative assumption that faith-based charities could address needs
traditionally met by state funded social work. Next, I will consider the rise of pastoral
counseling as a popular alternative to secular psychotherapy while exploring reasons that might
account for the explosive growth of this explicitly religious method of therapy. I will then
examine two studies that name and quantify social work students’ uneasiness with the topic of
religion, before quickly providing an epidemiological survey of religion in America. Finally, I
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will introduce the thought of the contemporary American theologian George Lindbeck whose
theological framework offers a uniquely powerful place from which to engage in crossdisciplinary dialogue between religion and Social Work.
An Original Closeness and the Ensuing Divide
In the early years of American social work the field was divided into sectarian and or
racialized categories (Leighninger, 2000). There were predominantly white Protestant
practitioners and there were practitioners who dedicated service to the populations frequently
ignored or misapprehended by such mainstream social work. This corrective effort included
Jewish, Catholic, and African American agencies (Barker 2008).
Our divisive roots are reflected in most social work textbooks. The profession's earliest
history holds a caution for those who look back on it. We have learned that unchecked
practitioner bias can poison our work, and that we do not exist apart from the larger culture we
deliver services within. In these early years the bias was often around religion. Early social
workers viewed non Protestant Christians and adherents of other religions as bearing a
fundamental flaw. Service delivery included attempts to make marginalized Catholic and Jewish
immigrants conform to Protestant ideals. This hegemonic dynamic was practiced alongside our
early failures to serve African American people and immigrants whose phenotype exempted
them from the attentions of early mainstream Social Workers. In early twentieth America, as in
other places, religion was used to cancel out the culture and even the humanity of the “other”.
One can also trace positive connections to the religiously oriented mission work of early
social workers such as Jane Addams. Compassion and the sense of responsibility for what befalls
one’s neighbor link early social work endeavors to ease suffering with contemporary social work.
“Philosophically, social work and religious schools of thought have common values. They both
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advocate compassion for others and human dignity, and both desire to ease the pain of suffering
and to address the needs of the most forgotten and vulnerable in society” (Bullis, 1996, p.17).
Thankfully, American social work's early Balkanization gave way to a storming and
forming period that expressed the nascent professions’ desire for broad, unifying transformation.
In this new consciousness, movement away from social work's “moralistic and paternalistic roots”
motivated reformers. At the same time there emerged a concomitant belief that the center of
training should be practice methods unmoored from religiously motivated moralism (Austin,
1986).
Finally, these changes took place amidst a broader American debate about seeming
conflicts between religion and science. While the debate would not crystallize nationally until
1925 when Tennessee passed the Butler Act which made it illegal to teach evolution in the
state’s public schools, science and religion had been in tension since the early days of the
European Enlightenment. Of course one of the most virulent atheists to inherit and propagate the
science side of that debate was Freud. Due to Freud’s foundational antipathy toward religion, the
contemporary American divide between scientific and religious discourse and Socials Work’s
concern to be understood as a scientific enterprise and the issues named above, entire generations
of social workers have not been trained to look for points of contact between the theories that
ground their work and the religious outlook of their clients. Indeed, our field eagerly moved
away from its early religiosity and has long been skeptical about truly integrating any religious
ideas into our training, education and practice.
The Door is Opened and “Spirituality” Walks In
However, in the mid-century the zeitgeist began to relax. The nineteen sixties saw an
American articulation of transpersonal psychology, more recently referred to as transpersonal

	
  

13

theory. These theories recognize a human impulse toward spirituality, whether expressed through
organized religion or the individual pursuit of transcendent truth. Here spirituality is permitted
back to the social work discourse; so long as it exists in a realm independent of formal religion.
Having been stung by the divisive power of religion once, our field is reluctant to be stung twice.
It is noteworthy that a central idea of transpersonal theory is the understanding of religious and
spiritual diversity as human diversity (Fowler, Hertzke, Olsen, Den Dulk, 2010) This is notable
both because it expresses the belief in belief and because it orders it around diversity; a new
paradigm for making sense of religion for American social theorists. Spirituality is taken to be a
dimension of human experience and behavior. Thus, rigid doctrines and an off putting,
seemingly exclusive God are no longer the object of talk about religion. Rather, human belief
becomes the focus of the conversation about spirituality.
This is typified by Abraham Maslow's naming of humanity's “peak experiences”. Maslow
stressed private experience of the transcendent as a development achievement possible after
spiritual maturation. He wrote “man is his own project and he does make himself” (Maslow,
1964). In the era some of the great champions of spirituality manage to conceptually shrink
religion into a size acceptable to the American psychiatric community. Fortunately, American
political life in these years is less individualistic.
Funding
During the previously discussed period in American history, government spending on
social services and programs expanded. In 1964 President Lyndon Johnson introduced to the
nation the idea of the Great Society, a country that was more than rich and powerful but also just
and intolerant of poverty. Johnson and the Democratic majority House and Senate, after his
landslide victory, made policy around these ideals targeting underserved Americans and their
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communities. Within months of the election Johnson had the Community Action Agency (CAA)
commissioned. The CAA was to have an office in every district in our nation to coordinate
health, social service and mental health services for Americans who needed them. For the better
part of twenty years government support of social services was strong. Johnson's War on Poverty
ushered in an era where access to services and equal opportunity were an explicit priority in
government spending (Andrew, 1998). Johnson's ethos included the now seemingly radical
thought that the ability of a nation to provide for its social need was a valuable metric of its
greatness.
This period of relatively robust government support for public social welfare and mental
health care came to a decisive end when Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980. The eighties bore
out a focus on individualism, with the idea of government as an entity which needed to be
limited. Reaganomics asserted that big government spending on social programs was hurting the
country and its economy and needed to be drastically cut back. The approach resonated with
Americans and they reelected Reagan and subsequently his vice President, George Bush to office
in 1988. Perhaps the ethos of the new era was best expressed in the inaugural address of 1989
where the newly elected President Bush places the wellbeing of impoverished American families
on a thousand points of light or simply, volunteers and voluntary social service agencies such as
churches (Andrew, 1998)
It is still striking to consider how diametrically opposed to Federal support our country's
leadership had become in those decades. Instead of the idea that the support should be
commensurate to the need and that the resulting balance should be a measure of national strength,
the new order rested on the notion that Americans must help themselves (Andrew, 1998).
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Social Work engaged in a critical evaluation of the notion that community volunteerism
and faith based organizations should bear responsibility for the need in our society. Concern
around service delivery was central to the debate. Critics doubted the effectiveness of service
delivery could match what the Federal Government could provide. The questions of who gets
services and how well they are delivered require government oversight. But how were small
community organizations and congregations going to manage government audits and red-tape?
The theme of the compromised prophetic voice was also central to the public debate in that era
(Chaves, 1999). Would faith communities and religious traditions historically critical of war,
human rights violations and discrimination be hushed by massive public money? These questions
roiled critics and raised the ever-present American concern for the separation of church and state
(Goodstein, 2001).
Finally, as social work began to emerge as a clearly defined and bordered profession its
gatekeepers and professional organizations became concerned to ensure that clinical social
workers were able to receive third-party insurance reimbursement (Specht, Courtney, 1994).
Even as they fought to wrest a slice of the reimbursement pie away from psychiatrists and
psychologists, social workers may have seen their religious counterparts in the so called helping
professions as a different sort of threat. Charity care from religious organizations and wellmeaning clergy may have threatened the market share of an increasingly turf-conscious
profession. Religious professionals and volunteers and social workers both share a concern for
those who are suffering. And yet, because of the financial support religious professionals receive
from their churches their service is often free or at least less expensive than that provided by
private practice social workers. As Harry Specht and Mark Courtney point out,
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Social work has become the largest single mental health profession, and the
development of the private practice of social work has become one of the most significant
trends in the profession. Confluent with these developments there has been an increasing
tendency of the profession to use its political power to support licensing of clinical social
workers and third-party payments for social workers who are so licensed (Specht &
Courtney, 1994, p.29).
All of this is to say that social work may have been motivated to distance itself from or define
itself against religiously rooted care for economic reasons as well.
The Growth of Pastoral Counseling
Meanwhile, the field of pastoral counseling continued developing. It existed alongside
social work in its early days and now is practiced as social work. In 1900, a founding force in the
clinical pastoral education movement, Anton Boisen, began placing theological candidates and
seminarians in psychiatric settings and hospitals. The interdisciplinary attentions of pastoral care
can actually be traced as far back at 1632, when clergy, essayist Thomas Hooker published casestudies on his work with parishioners. In the 1700's the great Congregationalist preacher
Jonathan Edwards routinely leveraged humanity’s emotional existence against the rationalism of
his day (Leslie, 2007). Today pastoral counseling flourishes in the U.S. There are “pastoral
psychology programs in virtually all seminaries and two national professional organizations
dealing with matters of policy and training.” (Leslie, 2007, p.107). In fact, pastoral counseling
accounts for over three million hours annually of psychotherapeutic treatment (Holifield, 2007).
It is clear that specific religious traditions and denominations are taking great care to train
their clergy as mental health practitioners, yet one has to wonder about the efficacy of such
training in our pluralistic religious environment. Can a Southern Baptist pastoral counselor deal
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sensitively with the needs and concerns of a Catholic immigrant? This is an important question,
but its converse hits much closer to home. Can a secularly trained social worker deal sensitively
with the particular religious concerns of any observant person?
The immense growth in the field of pastoral counseling raises questions for those of us
training secularly. How is pastoral counseling practicing psychotherapy? What is the difference
between what happens in a pastoral counselor's office and a therapist's office? It is difficult to
say if the growth in pastoral counseling hours has anything to do with a perceived deficiency of
some kind in secular clinical settings. However there are some widely agreed upon points of
distinction between the two types of mental healthcare that are noteworthy. H. Bruce Stokes is
the Dean of the School of Behavioral Sciences at California Baptist University. He teaches
graduate courses in marriage and family therapy. He has written extensively on the divide
between the two options of mental health care service delivery. The differences offered by Dr.
Stokes hold echoes and similarities with others currently participating in the dialogue.
One difference Stokes (2013) names is access. It is a generally accepted standard of
practice that therapists see clients in their offices during sessions. One can imagine unusual
circumstances which may warrant contact between client and therapist outside of session, but the
widely perceived norm is that this contact be highly limited. However, clergy and pastoral
counselors fill roles with boundaries that are far more fluid and are quite often much more
involved in a client's life. They may already have a familiar relationship and know one another
from varied settings both ecclesial and social. In Stokes’ words, “the only relationship allowed
the Clinical counselor is the formal counseling process while the Pastoral counselor may relate to
the client on several levels” (Stokes, 2013, p. 1). Elsewhere he elaborates:
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One of the primary differences in professional and congregational counseling is
the relational dynamic. In professional counseling a clinical setting is required and the
relationship between the counselor and client is fiduciary responsibility and unequal
power among relative strangers. This requires the strict use of ethics and law to protect
the client from harm. As a result, therapists are required to maintain limited contact
beyond the professional relationship with their client. In a congregational setting, a pastor
or Christian counselor uses multiple relationship (friend, coworker, fellow believer)
contexts and multiple meeting place strategies (home, clinic, restaurant, etc.) both for
understanding the problem and creating a healing within family and community context.
(Stokes, 2013, p.2).
While the following example is anecdotal, I think it typifies what Stokes is referring to.
When I lived in Wellesley, Massachusetts there was a well-regarded local Episcopalian priest
with a reputation as a good counselor. Once a week he would step outside of his counseling
office, put on his clerical collar and stand near the foyer of the town's most popular grocery store
from 10:00 in the morning until noon. He jokingly called this practice, office hours. Over the
course of the day he would undoubtedly encounter parishioners to whom he had provided
pastoral care. Such a practice sounds bizarre to those schooled in the stricter boundaries of
psychotherapeutic work. It is practically impossible to imagine a secular therapist wearing some
sort of uniform that identifies her as such, standing in a public spot, waiting for her clients to
randomly walk by. But in a small-town pastoral context it makes a certain amount of sense. The
grocery store priest told me he was merely formalizing a phenomenon that already took place
nearly every time he shopped for groceries. From the client's perspective his presence and the
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care it exhibited could have served as a reminder to follow up with further pastoral counseling
appointments.
Another difference asserted by Stokes is that within the context of pastoral counseling
clients are free to engage the counselor in conversation about the counselor's values, opinions,
faith and personal experience.
It is acceptable for a Clinical Counselor who is Christian to discuss their values
with a client who specifically asks, but giving direct advice or counsel consistent with
such values may not always be allowed. In a Pastoral Counseling context, both religious
values and behavioral science theories and methodologies are free to be openly explored,
but the counselor is expected to counsel and advise from the perspective of the religion
he or she represents. (Stokes, 2013, p. 2).
In contrast, a secular clinical therapist is likely to have internalized serious prohibitions
around the use of self. This renders pastoral therapy highly intersubjective by nature and may
point toward the kind of therapeutic alliance clients prefer to work within. Rather than an
objective, distant other the pastoral counselor can be someone from the client's own milieu, a
person who shares their faith, is a visible part of their community and is open with their own
struggles and triumphs.
Finally and perhaps most interestingly, Spokes writes of pastoral counselors
responsiveness to a long list of ailments, sadness and sorrows. Some are pathological and some
are life stage related. All of them could be on any clinical therapists' list of ailments to be
addressed save for one: spiritual illness (Stokes, 2013). Subscription to a belief in the reality of
such a condition, as distinct from secular explanations that aim to fit suffering spirituality into
the framework offered by the medical model, would seem a precondition to helping heal it. How
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can one address a spiritual illness if one is not trained to diagnose, name or even acknowledge
such a phenomenon? And why would a religiously minded sufferer take her spiritual pain to a
secular clinician practicing in a field that has been historically skeptical about the reality of such
suffering? It is akin to someone who does not believe in the efficacy of chiropractic medicine
seeking out a chiropractor because her back hurts.
Current Reluctance
Yet, if social work is intent on meeting its clients where they are rather than imposing our
own world view on top of theirs we must be ready to discuss and soothe that which is spiritually
troubling. Are we ready to open this door? The mid-eighties saw several large scale surveys on
clinician, faculty and student attitudes about including religious and spiritual content in social
work (Barker, 2008). Studies competed by Dudley & Helfgott, (1990); Derezotes & Evans,
(1995); Staral, (1990) revealed a common perceived inadequacy in a multitude of training
programs (Barker, 2008). Students, faculty and practitioners feel spirituality is an important
component to working with people. Yet, on the whole, they do not feel equipped to do it. The
studies encompassed schools of social work in 12 states along the eastern seaboard and
Washington D.C. Findings offer significant support for including faith-related topics in formal
training for MSW students.
Three key points of data stand out. Difference in social workers’ attitudes fall along the
lines of number of years in the field, personal experience or participation in spiritual practice and
coursework which exposes clinicians in training to the topic of faith in the lives of clients. Nearly
78% of respondents were female, with a vast majority of them identifying as white. Respondents
ranged in their personal faith observance with major groupings of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish
and Atheist (Dudley & Helfgott, 1990). These findings very likely have influenced the Council
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on Social Work Education recent initiatives to include spirituality in training. CSWE has
published numerous books, articles and other resources in the last decade dealing with inclusion
of faith-related topics into the social work classroom (CSWE,
http://www.cswe.org/CentersInitiatives/CurriculumResources/50777.aspx).
Still, comfort when working with religious content remains low. It is relegated to elective
status in most institutions which serves to keep young clinicians uncomfortable with the subject.
For instance, the Smith College School for Social Work offers post-graduate training that
provides participants with a certificate in Contemplative Clinical Practice. The aim of this short,
intensive training is to teach contemplative awareness practices while also helping participants
become more knowledgeable on how to appreciate a client’s belief system within the context of
therapy. The fact that such training is separated out of the MSW curriculum and reserved for
graduates illustrates why it is more experienced clinicians who report greater comfort discussing
their clients' faith. While they may not have been trained to consider religion, they have learned
on the job that religion is an important consideration for their clients.
In a penetrating insight, social work practice historian Stacey L. Barker (2008) writes,
“Currently spirituality and religion content in social work education is found most frequently in
the context of diversity and human development” (Barker, 2008,p. 9). She goes on to ask, “Is it
sufficient to address spirituality and religion only from a human diversity perspective”(Barker,
2008, p.9). Diversity and multicultural theories are tasked with specific work. Often, they look
to explore and dismantle unjust power dynamics between given groups of people. The
examination of power relations in the direction of every human category a righteously fired up
MSW student can name is a gigantic task. Certainly a person's faith practice is noteworthy for
the cultural implications it may present, and should be thought of in terms of power relations.
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But religion and or spiritual practice are bigger than this. Just as one should not reduce a given
culture to the role it plays in power dynamics one cannot reduce religion to the way it makes its
adherents different from one another or some assumed objective, secular norm. Moreover,
religion can be the ground for robust psychotherapy, prompting the thought that all clinicians
must not only, as a popular campus T-shirt demands, see color, we must also see religion.
An Epidemiological look at Religion in the U.S.
An epidemiological look at the practice of formal religion in the United States reveals the
following statistics. In a 2007 survey of more than 35,000 Americans, 78.4% identified as
affiliated with a formal faith tradition. Roughly 16% of adult Americans claim no religious
affiliation whatsoever, although there is a subpopulation here of individuals who believe in some
notion of God. They may have been raised in a particular faith but as an adult they left it (Pew
Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2007). The overt findings of the study demonstrate that
America is a highly religious country. This is case enough for Social Work to maintain consistent
discourse on working with people of faith. The study offers further insight into our population's
relationship with religion that is also germane to our work. That is the fluidity with which
Americans participate in faith life. Roughly 28 percent of religiously identified adults have
shifted from the tradition in which they were raised to another tradition. That statistic grows
significantly when you look at the shift from one Protestant denomination to another. It then
becomes 44 percent (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2007). This statistic does not take
into account people who change and then change back to the faith tradition of their childhood.
These shifting demographics, which should also be considered through patterns of immigration
and birth rates, do reflect what some social scientists refer to as the American marketplace of
religion.
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Since religion operates in peoples’ lives as a system from which meaning is made, it
should not be understood solely in terms of an identity characteristic. It is not enough to simply
make note of faith, it needs to be explored as it experienced by an individual and appreciated as a
potentially powerful force for both healing and trouble in a client’s life. How might the faith of
an American Muslim woman intersect with her object relations? Does someone raised in an
Orthodox Jewish home experience forgiveness in a way that intersects with the faith of their
childhood? Does a fundamentalist Christian have an understanding of redemption and atonement
that might be good to know? When we engage in therapeutic work with religious clients our
multi-theoretical training is engaging their theology. Thus, we must seek to understand how this
engagement plays out.
George Lindbeck’s Postliberal Christian Thought
Given the diversity of the American religious marketplace, one might hope that a social
worker who desires to be sensitive to her clients’ religious outlooks could simply develop a
sympathy to spirituality and immediately find a religious lingua franca through which to speak
spirituality to any and every believer. This is the hope of those who define themselves as
spiritual, but not religious. The assumption, expressed in a pithy and often used phrase, is that
different religions are “different paths up the same mountain.”
Unfortunately, no such mountain exists. The question of religion and social work would
be much simpler if it did. Imagine a Lutheran therapist and a Hindu client determined to find
religious common ground. It would be so simple if they were to able scrape away the
contradictory and distinctive claims their respective religions make in order to find that
underneath all the pious jargon they are talking about the same thing. If the Lutheran set aside
the distinctively Protestant claim that God accepts people into eternity through faith, not good
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works, and the Hindu set aside the distinctively Hindu belief that through the law of karma each
individual determines his or her own eternal destiny by their works the conversation could really
progress. But a far more likely scenario is that robbed of their religion’s central tenets they
would not be able to speak clearly about faith at all. For Protestant Christianity without the
doctrine of justification by faith alone has no reason to exist. And Hinduism without karma is
akin to English without vowels.
Viewed historically the move to reduce faith to a universal common denominator was a
nineteenth century response to the rise of science. As scientific progress questioned the
supernatural claims of Christianity and other faiths, western adherents fell back on the
inoffensive ethical dimension of their religions. In response to a culture in love with empiricism
that was suddenly scoffing at claims of resurrection, virgin birth and parting sea, Liberal
Protestant Christians dismissed such doctrines.
The modifier liberal in this phrase ought not to be confused with our contemporary
political usage. It has more to do with the classical understanding of liberalism as being a
philosophy that prioritizes the freedom of the individual. Liberal Protestantism is a modern
movement that reinterprets the biblical and historic doctrines and practices of Christianity in
order to bring them in line with the rise of science and nineteenth century Enlightenment thought.
According to the theologian Gary Dorrien, “It is an extremely elusive concept. A common thread
in Liberal Protestant thought is the desire to adapt religious ideas to modern culture and modes of
thinking. Liberal Protestantism insists that the world has changed since the time Christianity was
founded, making many Christian faith claims incomprehensible to people today “(Dorrien, 2001,
p. 47).
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Liberal Protestants are interested in adapting religious ideas to modern culture and
thought. Rather than reading the world through the Bible, Liberal Protestantism reads the Bible
through the world. For instance, early 19th century Liberal Protestant theologians practiced a
strident anti-supernaturalism—insisting that the Bible must be freed of symbolic myths and
miracle stories which act as obstacles to modern, rational believers. Rather than getting hung up
on fictional, mythical claims Liberal Protestants want to turn to the eternal truths such stories
point to. Liberal Protestantism tends to locate ultimate religious authority in the self. Rather than
submitting to an outmoded orthodoxy, Liberal Protestants turn inward and use their own personal
religious experience to authenticate or disregard doctrinal and Biblical claims. For instance, in
1888 the great German theologian Adolf von Harnak named the virgin birth a symbol and argued
that the important kernel of Christianty is and was the ethical higher righteousness that Jesus
taught (Harnack, 2011).
The problem with this approach is that it misunderstands how a given religion actually
works. Every religion has an ethical component. The first century Christian call to, do to others
as you would have them do to you, echoes a Buddhist teaching that predates it by ten-thousand
years: This is the sum of duty is do not do unto others, what you would not have them do unto
you. Religions have a nearly universal concern for justice between individuals. This is obviously
laudable, but from a therapeutic perspective it is not particularly helpful. That is because a given
religion shapes its adherents’ worldview and self-understanding. If a social worker begins with
the assumption that her religious clients all share a fundamentally similar perspective her ability
to understand their worldview will be limited. Yes, Buddhism and Catholicism both believe in
treating people well. It is unlikely, however, that such benign ethical instruction plays either a
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complicating or consoling role in whatever it was that brought a religiously observant client to
therapy.
Meanwhile the odd and contradictory truth claims of different faiths impact their
believers’ self-understanding in profound and profoundly different ways. What the therapist
needs is a way to hear believers that goes deeper than ethics and moves beyond what the
theologian Stanley Hauerwas calls the “Ultimate Vagueness” that sits in the middle of much
contemporary spirituality talk (Hauerwas, 2001, p.209).
It is at this point that danger asserts itself. The universalist assumptions that sit behind a
liberal attitude toward religion are not therapeutically helpful. Is the only alternative a
subscription to the particular truth claims of a given religion? This is the approach in some
conservative Christian pastoral counseling circles. Christian pastoral counselors are taught to
work with Christian clients. But it cannot be the approach of secularly trained social workers
who desire to work with a diverse clientele.
So what are we to do? If we accept the liberal dogma that holds all religions are traveling
up the same mountain, we risk watering down the differences that make a particular religion
powerful in a given client's life. But if we assume that the only way to understand this power is
to share their faith, we lose the advances made over the past 100 years and risk allying ourselves
with the sort of intolerance that scarred our field at its inception.
I propose that a road out of this conundrum has been paved by the contemporary
theologian George Lindbeck. Lindbeck’s (1984) key theological insight rests on Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Wittgenstein famously taught that language creates
human experience, rather than being an expression of one’s inner truth or reality. In his words,
“The limits of my language are the limits of my mind. All I know is what I have words for”
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(Wittgenstein, 1922/1974, p. 5-6). A trio of psychologists who followed Wittgenstein summed
his thought up thusly: “If we spoke a different language, we would perceive a somewhat
different world” (Whitney, Schneirla, & Robinson, 1950).
Lindbeck (1984) argues that religions function like languages. If you learn a particular
religion’s vocabulary, it’s strange, unique way of making meaning (whether it is the law of
karma, or salvation by faith alone) the Divine will become clear and your existence will be
correspondingly ordered. But if a believer does not practice a specific religion, one that makes
unique and strange claims which are bound to contradict the unique and strange claims of other
religions, her or his sense of God will remain vague and the religious experience will be jumbled.
In Lindbeck’s words, “One can no more be religious in general than one can speak language in
general” (Lindbeck, 1984, p.23).
From here Lindbeck refines conservative and liberal definitions of religion. He calls the
conservative approach propositionalist. It “emphasizes the cognitive aspects of religion and
stresses that the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth
claims about objective realities” (Lindbeck, 1984, p. 25). To draw an example from a
fundamentalist billboard that once dotted the south, a propositionalist Christian believes that,
Hell is real and fire is hot!
Although Christian fundamentalism claims to be a return to tradition, it is actually a
response to modernity and conducts itself according to the logic of modern science, which holds
that truth claims are either factual or they are not. Even though propositionalist faith often
appears to be in conflict with science the modern scientific worldview determines the ground that
fundamentalism walks upon. Grand religious claims (like the creation story or the incarnation)
are collapsed into scientific categories of possible or impossible. Fundamentalism then insists
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that they are possible and actually happened, as if the doctrines of Christianity were a biology
textbook. This leads Christian fundamentalism into all sorts of absurdities, such as the need to
assert that human beings and dinosaurs walked the earth at the same time.
As we have discussed, the major alternative to conservative faith in the United States is
typified by Liberal Protestantism. Liberal Protestantism tends to locate ultimate religious
authority in the self. Lindbeck calls this method of being religious experiential expressivism.
Experiental expressivism holds that religions are creative expressions of our deep, internal,
personal experiences of God. These expressions take different shapes and forms, but the root
experience is the same. The claims of a particular religion are symbols of inner feelings
(Lindbeck, 1984).
Against both of these understandings Lindbeck advocates a postliberal model that holds
“religions are the producers of experience” (Lindbeck, 1984, p. 38). In this understanding,
“religions are seen as comprehensive interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or
narratives and heavily ritualized, which structure human experience and understanding of self”
(Lindbeck, 1984, p. 32 italics added). Rather than a person's deep, internal experience of
existence surfacing in religious language, it is the language of a given religion, its particular
dogmas, doctrines and truth claims that shape a person's experience.
For the social worker, the advantage of this approach is powerful. She can avoid the
logical fallacy of assuming all religions are expressing the same truth and thereby avoid
misunderstanding, minimizing or disrespecting her clients’ religious outlook. At the same time,
she need not believe in the same manner a given client believes in order to have a deep
understanding of the client’s religious perspective. Instead, the social worker must learn the
client’s religion in an act akin to learning a new language. In Lindbeck’s formulation, becoming
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sympathetic to a particular religion “might on occasion be rather like achieving competence in
the totally nonoptional grammatical patterns and lexical resources of a foreign tongue”
(Lindbeck, 1984, p.33).
For example, in order to better understand a conservative Catholic client, an atheistic
social worker need not worry about the truth claims of her client’s faith any more than she might
worry that English is more true than Spanish. Instead of “the boasting and superiority that
destroys the possibility of open and mutually enriching dialogue” (Lindbeck, 1984, p. 69) she
can enter the unique logic of her client’s faith perspective and thereby better understand the
manner in which Catholicism’s power has shaped her client’s self-understanding. Even as she
does so the social worker can draw upon the language and the logic of a psychotherapeutic
worldview in order to dialogue with her client’s religious perspective.
Therefore it is therapeutically advantageous for a social worker to have a working
knowledge of the doctrines and claims of different religions. However, such knowledge is hard
to gain. If we cannot assume that all religions are expressions of the same thing we must gain a
particular understanding of a variety of religions. Where to begin? One cannot expect that even
the most rigorous MSW program will prioritize religion in a manner that introduces its students
to the broad variety of faiths in the United States.
And yet, if we cannot be universal we must be particular. Just as there is not room in an
MSW program to consider all the religions of the world, there is not space in this thesis to model
dialogue between a variety of different religions and psychodynamic theories. Therefore, I will
limit myself to an exploration of how the self-understanding generated by Protestant Christian
doctrine might dialogue with psychotherapeutic insights. Of course, knowledge and respect for
all religious backgrounds must be cultivated. Rather than suggesting the superiority of the
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tradition I engage here, I want to lift this particular intersection as an example of what it might
look like for secular therapy and any religious worldview to dialogue with one another.
There are, of course, a variety of protestantisms in the United States. From
fundamentalist Baptists to liberal Episcopalians, American non-Catholic Christianity is
remarkably diverse. However, one doctrine sits at the root of every variety of Protestantism.
From its inception in the 15th century Protestant Christianity has been distinct from Roman
Catholicism in its belief that humanity is absolutely cut off from God. The Protestant Doctrine of
the fall is more dire and all-encompassing than its Catholic counterpart. While official Catholic
doctrine holds that individual moral progress is both desirable and possible, orthodox Protestant
teaching holds that human beings are subject to what John Calvin called total depravity. This
does not mean that each individual is totally depraved. Rather, the doctrine holds that all people
are inclined by nature to serve their own interests while rejecting the will of God. It does not
mean that all people are as bad as possible, but that even selfless human acts are tainted by selfinterest. (Calvin, 1536/1975) This is because to be human is to be cut off from God. Any
observant Protestant who enters a therapist’s office will have been exposed to this claim. Many
of them will have been shaped and plagued by its consequences.
This fact may be quite foreign to secular practitioners. For instance, an observant
Protestant Christian may have been taught to understand her marriage vows as analogous to or
reflective of the covenant that God makes with Israel and later, through Christ, with all people.
In this kind of covenantal arrangement both parties vow fidelity and take on reciprocal
obligations. God promises to always be there for Israel. Israel promises to obey God. Both
parties vow to look beyond their self-interest and toward the interests of the other. When marital
vows are seen in a similar light Christians come to understand the practice of marriage as being
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something like God’s relationship to humanity. Rather than looking to their own self-interest,
both partners in a marriage look first to the other’s need. When this happens, when marital vows
are lived out, human relationships take on the quality of something much greater.
Yet, not all marriages succeed or last. Oftentimes the reasons for divorce are perfectly
rational. People grow away from one another. Sometimes the reasons for divorce are horrific.
Women are abused; partners betray one another. Regardless of the root cause of a divorce, an
observant Christian could experience it as symptomatic of her estrangement from the divine.
When this is the case, purely secular work could easily neglect to consider the toll that sin is
taking on a client.
In the next chapters the theological concept of sin will be explored in relation to several
psychological and psychodynamic theories. How can the discipline of theology galvanize our
work as therapists? How can an appreciation for the protestant doctrine of sin help us meet our
clients in their own self-understanding? The following chapter will explain and explore the
theologian Paul Tillich’s reformulation of the doctrine of sin. It will then place Tillich’s ideas in
conversation with psychodynamic theory as follows: First, Tillich’s understanding of sin as
separation from self, other and the ground of all being will be related to the British Object
Relations School's understanding of our core defenses and their role in our estrangement from
one another. We will look particularly at Melanie Kleins' paranoid schizoid and depressive
internal positions and Heinz Kohuts' conceptualization of the tripolar self and Self Psychology.
What becomes visible in Kleinian theory when seeing through the lens of Tillichian separation?
How do these ideas collide, spark and challenge one another when applied to clients? Next, the
thesis will compare Kohut’s tripolar self with the tri-fold separation.
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CHAPTER III
Object Relations and Protestant Thought
Introduction
In this chapter I will compare two different psychodynamic theories to the theologian
Paul Tillich’s understanding of sin. I will begin by defining and explaining Tillich’s innovative
reconceptualization of sin as a state of three-fold estrangement. Using Tillich’s work I will
suggest that the popular understanding of sin as immoral action is neither true to its theological
roots in Liberal Protestantism nor therapeutically helpful.
I will then compare Tillich’s insights with the Object Relations theory put forth by
Melanie Klein. I will begin by exploring how Klein is both indebted to, and purposefully
distanced from Freud. I will then offer a brief overview of Klein’s thought before comparing and
contrasting her ideas with a Tillichian understanding of sin. Finally, I will introduce Heinz
Kohut’s theory of Self Psychology in an effort to compare and contrast Tillich’s understanding
of reunion through grace with the Object Relations School’s understanding of what is needed to
cope with one’s existential pain. In a concluding discussion section I will briefly explore the way
that contemporary American individualism both illustrates and exacerbates Tillich and the
Object Relations School’s understanding of separation.
	
  

	
  

33

Paul Tillich’s Reimagining of Sin as Separation
Unlike his theological opponents, many contemporary orthodox Christian thinkers and
most of his predecessors, Paul Tillich believed that Christian thought could not happen at a
remove from the wider culture. His thought refused to consider the Christian voice as an outside
voice, even one that aimed to support the world. Instead, he argued that Christian categories,
Christian questions and Christian answers emerged out of the religion's deep dialogue with
existence itself. Therefore Christian concerns are existential concerns. They may be framed
within the particularities of the Christian faith, but they speak to and from our shared and
universal experience of living. Tillich sees human existence as a question and Christian truth
claims (or at least his own highly philosophical interpretation of them) as answers. In his words,
“The Christian message provides the answers to the questions implied in human existence . . .
The question is human existence itself” (Tillich, 1950, p. 62).
But why does existence need an answer? How have we gone awry and why? What is it
that shapes us and eats at us and leaves us dissatisfied? Why do we behave in ways that hurt both
the ones we love the most and our very selves? Tillich believes that Christianity responds to such
questions. And observant Protestants seeking therapy will have heard the response proclaimed
from the pulpit and in the context of their particular church. However, therapy aims to help by
delving deeply into the unique form such questions take in a given individual's life. If
Christianity exists to answer the questions implied by human existence, perhaps it is the
psychotherapeutic tradition that can best make the implied explicit.
First, let us explore Tillich’s understanding of what it is that might call or drive a person
to seek out a therapeutic relationship. In his more philosophical writings, Tillich famously
reformulated this doctrine of sin as a state of estrangement. He borrowed the term from Hegel
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who used it to describe “life processes as possessing an original unity which is disrupted by the
split into subjectivity and objectivity” (Tillich, 1950, p. 47). Tillich used the concept of
separation in a two-fold manner. First, he argued that to say humanity lives in a state of
estrangement is to say that “Man [sic] as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be.
He is estranged from his true being” (Tillich, 1950, p .47). But Tillich did not want to suggest
that this state was irreparable. This is why he preferred estrangement to a more radical adjective
such as abandonment. To be estranged is to suggest that reunion is possible. “The profundity of
the term ‘estrangement’ lies in the implication that one belongs essentially to that from which
one is estranged. Man is not a stranger to his true being, for he belongs to it. He is judged by it
but cannot be completely separated, even if he is hostile to it” (Tillich, 1950, p. 45).
However, in his later more popular writings Tillich changed his vocabulary and used the
word separation as that which best describes the state we exist in. He did this because he felt it
was a better stand-in for the sharper word, sin. And in terms of Christian doctrine sin is what
Tillich is describing. When we hear the word we tend to think of sins: misdeeds and wrongdoing,
violations of a moral code. Tillich forcefully argued that this was a gross misunderstanding of
what the Bible means when it says sin. “Sin does not mean an immoral act. ‘Sin’ should never be
used in the plural. Not our sins, but rather our sin is the great all-pervading problem of our life
(Tillich, 1950, p 154). Following the ideas of the Apostle Paul, Tillich argued that first we live
under sin's dominion, then we commit sins. Our wrongdoing is symptomatic of our larger
problem. “If one speaks of ‘sins’ and refers to special acts which are considered as sinful, one
should always be conscious of the fact that ‘sins’ are expressions of ‘sin” (Tillich, 1950, p. 47).
He recognized, however, that it would be nearly impossible to tear the word away from
its association with discrete acts that violate of moral codes. Therefore he said,
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I should like to suggest another word to you, not as a substitute for the word ‘sin’ but as a
useful clue in the interpretation of the word ‘sin’: ‘separation.’ Separation is an aspect of
the experience of everyone. Perhaps the word ‘sin’ has the same root as the word
‘asunder.’ In any case, sin is separation. To be in the state of sin is to be in the state of
separation” (Tillich, 1950, p. 156).
Tillich held that sin manifests itself as a state of three-fold estrangement. Which is to say that
human suffering occurs because:
1) Humanity is separated from God, whom Tillich referred to as “the Ground of Being.”
“We are separated from the Ground of our Being . . . from the origin and aim of our life.
And we do not know where we have come from or where we are going” (Tillich, 1950, p.
159).
2) As a result of this elemental separation, people are divided from their own best selves.
There is an inner tension between the woman I am and the woman I am meant to be.
“There is separation of a man from himself . . . Man is split within himself. Life moves
against itself through aggression, hate and despair. It is a mixture of selfishness and selfhate that permanently pursues us” (Tillich, 1950, p. 153).
3) As a result of the ensuing self-loathing, selfishness and self-serving actions I then find
myself cut off or separated from other people. This is “separation among individual
people.” “There is something in the misfortune of our best friends which does not
displease us” (Tillich, 1950, p.153).” And later, “In some sections of Europe all children
under the age of three are sick and dying. The strangeness of life to life is evident in the
strange fact that we can know this, and yet can live today, this morning, tonight, as
though we were completely ignorant. And I refer to the most sensitive people among us.
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In both mankind and nature life is separated from life. Estrangement prevails among all
things that live” (Tillich, 1950 p.163).
Using the language of Tillich, it seems safe to say that when a Protestant seeks
therapeutic help she may be troubled because she has been sinned against, has sinned herself, or
is suffering from the aimlessness and meaninglessness that sin inflicts on all who exist. Because
observant Protestants frame existence in terms of the Fall and its consequences such analysis
may be immediately understandable to her. Indeed, she may have already diagnosed her
condition using such language. How then can the tools of analysis afforded by psychotherapy
enter the conversation.
Melanie Klein and the British School of Object Relations: A Brief Overview
The body of theory now known as the British school of Object Relations was first
articulated by the work of Melanie Klein in the early 1920's. Klein, an Austrian born
psychoanalyst was raised one generation removed from Jewish Orthodoxy. Her father left
religion behind and sought professional training as a medical doctor rather than a rabbi as his
own father would have wished (Segal, 1979). Klein declared herself atheistic but refrained from
condemning religion altogether. In her work with children she asserted the belief that all parents
should raise children according to whatever religious feeling they held (Segal, 1979). Klein was
originally a strict Freudian and her early work reflected this; it grew both out of and away from
Freud's assertions of instinctual drives that have aims and objects through which those aims are
realized (Freud, 1922). Klein, and later Object Relations theorists kept these ideas intact for the
most part, but challenged the motives put forth by early Freudian theory. While Freud made
room for and wrote about the unique attachment between infant and mother, calling it both
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“unparallelled and the prototype for all later love relations” (Freud, year, p.188) he still attributed
human motives as sourced by aggressive and sexual instincts.
In a move away from Freud, Klein and other theorists of the Object Relations school
reconceptualized the source of our basic instincts. Rather than seeing them as expressions of our
root hostility, belligerence and wounded sexual impulses, Klein and her followers argued that
our primary drives are organized around attachment. Because Freud did lift up attachments
alongside his understanding of our instinctual drives he,
Left room for theoretical division in subsequent psychoanalytic theory concerned
with the origins of these ties. In one tradition are theorists who follow Freud's emphasis
on the lability of objects and his view that infant acquires the mother as object through
his dependence on her for need gratification. This group of theorists views the
development of object relations as being inextricably intertwined with ego development,
and thus as being dependent on the acquisition of cognitive structures not present at the
beginning. This is the tradition of ego psychology. The other group of theorists, implicitly
or explicitly picking up on Freud's reference to a phylogenetic foundation, views object
relations as primary, rather than secondary and acquired. This tradition is self designated
as object relations theory. (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Walls,1978, p. 4).
Klein focused her initial attention on the psychological life and development of early
childhood. Her early work examined infant anxiety, the first experiences of guilt and destructive
fantasies toward the mother (Klein, 1948). Throughout her work she was interested in the
development of the superego, postulating that the human conscience had earlier origins than
Freud asserted (Klein, 1948). She believed that we are born into a state of unendurable anxiety
and our first psychic processes are to protect us from and negotiate such agony.
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While Klein kept faith with the central concepts of Freudian thought, she offered a body
of theory based on her own work that challenged some Freudian ideas. Klein proposed that
beginning in infancy human beings vacillate between the paranoid-schizoid position and the
depressive position. “Klein thought of a ‘position’ as a constellation or set of psychical
phenomena and functions (instincts, anxieties, thoughts, feelings, defenses, fantasies and object
relations) potentially present in the here and now” (Demir, 2008, p.53). Both of these positions
employ the key defense mechanisms of idealizing, and splitting, which is a breaking apart of the
self-object into good and bad parts. Splitting entails the use of other defenses such as idealizing
and projective identification and introjection. Klein proposes that once a self-object has been
divided into good and bad through splitting, we have greater freedom to idealize a part as if it
were a whole. And we have greater freedom to dispatch our own hated parts onto the split up
self-objects’ bad parts. This formulation offered a more attachment focused foundation for child
mental health. Her insight and thinking launched what has evolved into contemporary attachment
theory.
Finding Common Themes: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue Comparing Tillich and Object
Relations Theory
Both Klein and Tillich recognize that to be, is to see that life is not what it should be.
Tillich says that to be alive is to be cut off from the Ground of Being. Meanwhile, as I have
noted above, Klein holds that each human being is born into a state of unendurable anxiety and
therefore each infant quickly proceeds to both suffer in and wrestle with this state. In both cases
to exist is to recognize that existence is not what it should be. What happens as a result of such
awareness? Klein argues that we must defend ourselves from the pain of existence by utilizing a
complex set of defenses. Our first defenses surface in the mechanisms of denial, splitting,
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projection and projective identification, withdrawal and omnipotent control. Because life is not
as it should be, we are not born into absolute safety. Therefore, in infancy we seek sanctuary
from the instinctual persecutory fears experienced in the infant's body (Bacal, 1990). Klein
suggests that these persecutory anxieties are painfully felt in the body through choking,
breathlessness, hunger and other tensions, giving rise to aggressions toward the mother (Klein,
1964). Her frequent writing partner and editor Joan Riviere articulated the infant predicament as
having “hatred and aggressive feelings aroused and he [the infant] becomes dominated by the
impulses to destroy the very person who is the object of all his desires and who in his mind is
linked up with everything he experiences, good and bad alike” (Klein & Riviere, 1964, p 43.).
In an effort to connect Klein’s theory to Tillich’s theological terms one might say that the
infant’s separation from the ground of being immediately manifests itself in her separation from
the other, from the mother. In an effort to deal with the fact that existence itself is threatening the
infant unwittingly confounds and compounds things by setting off an incredibly complex
relationship with her primary object, the person with whom she relates most regularly and most
intimately. Why is a given client’s life not what it ought to be? To say that he or she is cut off
from God is too simple. Her church can tell her this, but it does not shed any light on the
complexities of her relationships with other people. Theology can explain that her relationships
with others are fractured because her foundational relationship to existence is broken, but the
field is not concerned to explain the psychological implications of this truth. Thankfully, a
Kleinian perspective is.
According to Klein, in infancy we move between crisis and crisis defense. The crises
revolve around our physical needs and the subsequent need for the object to satisfy them. These
needs are expressions of an utter dependence that orders the newborn ego entirely around its
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relationship to the object. In a perfect world this would not present a problem. However, Klein
believes that even in earliest life, human beings experience a state of absolute dependence as
intolerable (Segal, 1979). The need to be unyoked seems endemic to the human condition. We
refuse to be reliant. The fact that infancy makes our absolute contingency obvious does not stop
infants from objecting (Tillich, 1954).
Which is to say that even in earliest life we make war with our dependence. Written into
our very being is a destructive impulse toward the life-giving, life-sustaining object. Yet, when
we war with the life-giving and life-sustaining object, we war with our very selves. Without the
object the infant not only dies, it does not come into being in the first place. Klein calls this
primary envy (Segal, 1979). Meanwhile, Tillich gestures toward the same phenomenon when he
says that life moves against itself. There is something within us that sabotages our own selfinterest. If only an infant could be content with her dependency.
Klein notes that as the infant grows it grows able to divide the object into good and bad
parts. However, Klein observed that our first experience of the object is as a whole. When set
against our later ability to split the object, this foundational encounter with the whole object is of
great consequence. The whole object epiphany levels an indictment at the nascent ego. The
experience of the object as whole is akin to psychological birth, and as such it is wrought, painful
even. No longer can the infant make war on the object with impunity. Now the complex and
contradictory experience of guilt is at play in the infant psyche.
“With the introjection of the complete object in about the second quarter of the
first year marked steps in integration are made. This implies important changes in the
relation to objects. The loved and hated aspects of the mother are no longer felt to be so
widely separated, and the result is an increased fear of loss, states akin to mourning and a
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feeling of guilt, because the aggressive impulses are felt to be directed against the loved
object” (Klein, 1946, p.38).
The infant has not only acted out of the state of separation she is born into, she is
suddenly aware of this fact. This is the depressive position. The depressive position is unique as
a milestone in that that it lasts our entire lives. For our entire lives we will hurt our loved objects
and in the doing of this, we will hurt ourselves. As Tillich notes, the separation from self and
separation from other galvanize and reinforce each other (Tillich, 1954).
If this were the end of Klein's contribution to our understanding of early psychological
life, it would be bleak. But the Kleinian lens allows more light in than might be perceived at first
glance. Once the infant has taken up the depressive position new anxieties emerge and new
defenses are required. Omnipotent fantasies of aggression now exist alongside fantasies of
reparation and healing. Klein understands the advent of reparation as stage bound in the infant’s
development. “The kinds of depressive anxieties experienced by the child change as the
depressive position is worked through. At the early stages of the depressive position, the love
and concern for others seems primarily motived from the fear that the fantasied destruction of the
good objects will also destroy the self. However the concern for the fate of the object soon comes
to reflect a genuine concern for the object as a separate entity, which Klein sees as stemming
from the child's gratitude for the love it has received from his mother” (Glover, 1998, p. 32 )
Klein asserts that as deeply rooted as our impulse to suckle and sob and yowl and aggress is our
impulse toward reparation, and that gratitude, rooted in our birth, will give rise to the need to
give in relationship as well as to receive. It is noteworthy that Klein saw the human capacity for
gratitude, and give and take in relationship as elusive. For the infant who has entered into the
depressive state, reparation exists only as a permanent possibility, not as a permanent state.
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Throughout life human beings will oscillate between the depressive position and the position that
preceded it, the paranoid-schizoid position (Segal, 1979).
Klein described the earliest position as paranoid-schizoid. The infant is born into terror,
believing that she is surrounded by violative threat and invasion. The early experience of total
threat activates fantasies in the helpless newborn. In this primary stage perceptions are keen if
undeveloped, and the hyper-watchful babe splits and destroys projected enemies. Splitting the
external world allows the infant the concept of good and bad. Then it provides the means to
identify with the good. In earliest life we cast off our bad feelings on living targets through
projective identification and in earliest life we endeavor to take in the goodness of other living
beings through idealization. The mechanisms of the paranoid-schizoid position trouble the infant
through the whole of her life. Even a well-adjusted adult, largely content in their social
relationships, will find the lure of projective identification too convenient, too easy and too
effective to abstain from.
All that is required by this defense is that we have emotions we'd prefer to rid ourselves
of, and an object on which to project them. As our resourcefulness grows, we become adept at
our unconscious smear campaigns, finding ways to use people we have never met, splitting our
intolerable parts off and releasing them onto our object. Perhaps this more discreet ridding of self
is observable in the practice of unconscious racism. “Racism involves mental structures and
psychodynamic processes that operate in both the perpetrator of such social actions and the
victim” (Rasmussen, & Sulhani, 2012, p. 134). Racism acts for many of us as a mechanism for
projective identification based on the maintenance of meaningless phenotypic categories.
The Paranoid-schizoid position is also a position we move into and out of throughout
adult life. Klein holds that one does not ever fully graduate the paranoid-schizoid position, there
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is no cathartic freedom later in life for the enlightened. It so effectively services the ego, it is
never fully quit. “The binary splitting is essential for healthy development as it enables the infant
to take in (internalization) and hold on to sufficient good experience to provide a central core
around which to begin to integrate the contrasting aspects of the self” (Klein, 1935, p.40). Before
we can experience wholeness, we will know separation. In Tillichian terms, separation has to
abound in order for reunion to be possible (Tillich 1954). Or in the language of Martin Luther,
whose thought Tillich builds upon, one must recognize that her life is out of whack in order to
realize that healing is possible.
If you are a preacher of mercy, do not preach an imaginary but the true mercy. If
the mercy is true, you must therefore bear the true, not an imaginary sin. God does not
save those who are only imaginary sinners. Be a sinner, and let your sins be strong (sin
boldly), but let your trust in Christ be stronger, and rejoice in Christ who is the victor
over sin, death, and the world (Martin Luther, as cited in Atkinson, 1987, p. 98).
This is not to say that the hope for healing obscures the pain of existence. Klein does not
make such a claim and neither does Tillich. Indeed, his thought delves deeply into our awareness
of our estrangement. We know that we are separated. We not only suffer with all other creatures
because of the self-destructive consequences of our separation, but also know why we suffer. We
know that we are estranged from something to which we really belong, and with which we
should be united. We know that the fate of separation is not merely a natural event like a flash of
sudden lightning, but that it is an experience in which we actively participate, in which our whole
personality is involved (Tillich, 1950, p. 196).
Later, Tillich goes on to elaborate on the spiritual toll such inescapable truth takes on the
individual and her relationships.
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Who has not, at some time, been lonely in the midst of a social event? The feeling
of our separation from the rest of life is most acute when we are surrounded by it in noise
and talk. We realize that much more than in moments of solitude how strange we are to
each other, how estranged life is from life. Each one of us draws back into himself. We
cannot penetrate the hidden center of another individual; nor can that individual pass
beyond the shroud that covers our own being (Tillich,1957, p.55).
Kohut’s Contribution
Tillich names it well, but what cost does an awareness of this reality take on an
individual? The internal experience of self is the concern of the latter Object Relations theorist,
Heinz Kohut, whose theory of Self Psychology facilitated another strain of traditional Object
Relationist thought. In his early career Kohut was a disciplined Freudian, however his later work
life gave way to his own formulated classical psychoanalytic thought which bears the name Self
Psychology (Flanagan, 2011). Kohut departed from Freudian Structural Theory offering the
tripolar self as the psyche’s organizing apparatus. Like many of the prominent Object
Relationists before him, Kohut was interested in the inner representations of self and self-objects
and the way these representations are expressed and lived out throughout an individual’s life.
Aspects of Self Psychology carry similarities to Klein. Kohut observes splits in
individuals conducive to an internal disavowal of traits. Like the skins of an onion we bear a
layer of narcissism (healthy or otherwise) and a layer of repression over our genuine selves that
cobbles a kind of armor for our hidden vulnerabilities (Siegal, 1996). Self Psychology speaks of
two types of narcissistic transferences. One is the “therapeutic activation of the idealized parent
imago, and the activation of the grandiose self which will be called the mirror transference”
(Kohut 1968, p. 16). Perhaps the most central tenet of Self Psychology is the conceptualization
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of the tripolar self. Tripolar is indicated by the pole of our grandiose, exhibitionist desires, our
requirement of twinship and for the parent imago (Baker, 1987).
A summary of Kohut’s self psychology centers on self esteem, narcissism (healthy or
otherwise) and early internal experience of other, or self-object. Kohut asserts that healthy self
regard is rooted in particular attributes in early important relationships. The self-objects he refers
to are those we experienced as primary care givers and therefore have internal representations of.
A key concept of self psychology is that without these particular attributes the development of
the true self will be compromised. Without them the developing self may be ordered around the
unmet need for affirmation. The particular attributes are mirroring or affirmation of a child’s
value, ability and worth. Idealizing which allows a child to experience merger with the cherished
self-object. Finally, twinship which allows the child the meaningful experience of belonging, or
sameness with those around her or him (Flanagan, 2011). Self psychology cautions that if these
tripolar qualities are not present in the child’s early experience, the self will suffer
developmentally. In order to develop a healthy sense of self the child is first provided with
emotional regulation by the self-object. Then over time, a process Kohut names transmuting
internalization takes place. Transmuting internalization is an investment over time, that should
nurture a child into a self regulating individual, and in this process the child’s original
dependence on the self-object is reduced (Flanagan, 2011).
In earliest childhood we demonstrate our longing to see ourselves positively reflected in
our self objects (Kohut, 2007/1968). Our first sense of value is from the parent’s affirmation of
the child’s expressions of self. The first steps, mastery of the toilet, sandcastles, scaled trees, gold
stars, kindnesses and charities are all meant to witnessed, in order to be completed. If not
witnessed and affirmed by the parent figures, the foundation of self worth is in part, undone.
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These calls, if unanswered, assail our well-being right through the years. In our hunger to be seen
and heard we may turn inward for the kinds of affirmation the parent figure provides. Or, in this
hunger we may aggressively try to wring it from the world around us. But there is no healthy
substitute for the authentic experience. It must be had, even if it is had years later with an
individual’s therapist.
From the first moments of life, the parent imago is our promise in a painful world. The
promise is expansive and inexhaustible, it is the ground of the infant’s being. The idealized
imago is source of comfort and love and can banish all newborn terrors. Many of our first urges
are around merging with this omnipotent source of security (Kohut, 2007/1968). Gradually these
urges relax to urges for nearness versus merger. From there they graduate further to knowledge
of the source (Baker,1987). We carry the good enough parent with us always. They source our
sense of security in the world throughout our lives.
Twinship is the third integral pole of selfhood. This was the last formulation Kohut put
forth in his final book. This is the ongoing requirement for one to perceive a general likeness
with others in the world around them (Lessem, 2005). This need will begin with the first
caregiver/s and then extend out toward peers later. Later still it may be present in intimate
relationships.
The animating force of twinship is the irresistible lure of positive communion with
another. When this happens, the divisions between the child and caretaker, the best buddies or
the close couple, melt away from you and me to we. Once joined with the twin object the
fortified self can thrive both in the moment of the twinship experience and in moments where the
solitary self bears an indisputable imprint of belonging. Both Klein and Kohut direct our
understanding of self to be self in relation.
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Let us consider the concept of trifold estrangement with the tri-polar self. The self in the
trifold estrangement is a fluid self, shifting moment to moment over a lifetime. This self
expresses an individual's interpretation of existence (Tillich, 1951). For Tillich, this expression is
mediated through the self’s situation. Situation as defined by existential theology bears striking
likeness to situation as defined by social work, but is at core discrete from the concept of the
psychological and sociological state in which individuals and groups live (Tillich, 1954). The
concept of trifold estrangement urges us to conceive of situation as “the scientific and artistic, the
economic, political, and ethical forms in which [the self] expresses interpretation of existence”
(Tillich, 1954, p. 80). Existence is interpreted by the self through these lenses, an ongoing act of
creation. I want to suggest that the trifold estrangement concept of situation expands the
commonly held social work concept of person in situation.
As therapists we want to know a client's self. We want to see and understand something
about a person which is to large part invisible, unknowable. To a certain extent we are
perpetually seeking something we can never know completely. But there is a rich and vital world
in the seeking that transforms folly to acute sagaciousness. We will never have clear, explicit,
full knowledge of a client's self. We cannot get it, but we can get at it. Getting at it concerns us
very much with the ways a client interprets existence.
Now let us consider the tripolar self. Kohut conceptualized the self as composed of three
developmental streams; the need of the grandiose self, the need for the idealized imago, the need
for twinship (Flanagan, 2011). Self psychology asserts that client problems originate in early self
object empathy deficits. How does the idea of early empathic self object failure align with the
trifold estrangement concept of situation? The estrangement concept of situation points us
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toward listening for client interpretations of existence while self object empathy deficits point us
toward listening for the client experience of self and other.,
Personal ethics are a major artery for all interpretive pathways. An individual's ethical
framework can convey aspects of selfhood not otherwise apparent. What is revealed in the
therapeutic setting when a client asserts the depths of their personal sense of right and wrong?
So often our personal hells bear not only the wrong done to us, but the wrong we fear we've done
to others. A tripolar stance invites us to consider how both lines of thought hold quiet gesture
toward tumultuous periods in an individuals self functioning development. The tripolar stance
sets its vision on the ways in which an individual experiences themselves as fragmented. A client
who experiences their ethical charge as a parent to guarantee academic success from their child
without thought to the child's emotional life may be enactment of their own struggles to merge
with the imago as a young child. The client's devastated self esteem recreates the disruptions in
the relationship between self and self object now from the self object side.
What is the reflection of a self never mirrored? A client never convinced they possess the
ability to make change, to make gains in their functioning may be enacting the unmet need for
grandiosity necessary to a healthy development of self. Their internal representation of self is
fragmented. This particular aspect of the tripolar self lines up almost symmetrically with the
aspect of trifold estrangement referred to as separation from self. Trifold estrangement says
separation from self means we can never be the woman or man we are meant to be, it will always
be struggle to unite with our full human potential as a human being. In the understanding of the
trifold self there is a springtime for the self. A springtime where our infant grandiosity must be
told back to us. If it is told back to us, it is ours, ours to repeat, and repeat. The poet Robert
Browning sets a metaphor of healthy narcissism to verse in these lines; “that's the wise wood
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thrush, he sings each song twice over, lest you think he never could recapture that first fine
carless rapture! (Browning, 1845/2010) Without the affirmative mirroring of the self object, our
first attempts at song, at individuality will die on our lips.
A client's experience of twinship also is told through their interpretation of existence.
Twinship is associated with the period of latency, when psychic pain is connected to feelings of
isolation, not belonging or experiencing the self as part of something greater than the self.
Feeling part of a family, a circle of friendship, or community over the course of a lifetime
continues to broaden from the micro to the mezzo and even to macro levels of the experience of
belonging. My family, neighborhood, profession, friends, country and faith all have claim to my
understanding of my selfhood. And I have a claim on these structures as confirming my selfhood.
An Example of the Two Theories Bridged
While Tillich’s thought on separation and the Object Relations school’s understanding of
what it takes to find individual wholeness arise out of quite different disciplines, they can be
bridged. In fact, they often are. This can happen in therapeutic practice with a religiously minded
individual, but the overlap also pops up in more unlikely places and programs.
The urban neighborhood I live in has an old iconic church on a major intersection. In this
church there is a preschool, within this preschool there is a social playgroup called First Friday
that gathers monthly for children whose early experiences of their prescribed gender roles differ
from their experience of their selves. I have been a guest at these playgroups many times. At
these typical joyful and unruly open play dates there are kids from around the corner who walked
or scootered there in a matter of minutes and there are families there from across the city, the
farthest flung suburb and beyond. Siblings and parents find fast friendship and kindergarten and
pre- kindergarten transgender children are nurtured and affirmed as part of things, bearing an
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essential likeness to others. It looks like the mundane. Children tell secrets, do craft projects and
run wild with each other while adults sip coffee and chat. Yet, these gatherings are anything but
typical for these families. It is a tremendously vigorous, community wide site of a twinship
experience that fortifies participants with so much more than kickball skills. The First Friday
playgroup offers a few hours of twinship experience each month to every member of the family
who will attend. Families come in a variety of configurations and can appear to have little in
common with other families present. The thing that unites them, the shared goal of emotional
safety where they can be their authentic selves overwhelms many of the ordinary categories
employed to divide them in other contexts. This particular twinship phenomenon contains
meaningful parallels between the theoretical underpinning of the tripolar self and sin as
estrangement.
A parent whose child is regularly assailed by gender messaging that indicts their
experience of themselves is given the opportunity to witness their child in an environment of
total acceptance. That same parent gets the opportunity to offer acceptance to other children who
are similarly messaged. The siblings who bear witness perhaps even more acutely than the
parents to the rejections of their little sisters and brothers by the broader community are afforded
the opportunity to shake loose their own shackles slapped onto them by gender normative
schools and neighborhoods. The guilt, protectiveness, and anger can be temporarily surrendered
to twinship and acceptance. Finally what value do we ascribe to these gatherings for seemingly
oblivious kindergartners? Tripolar self theory explains the value this community as relevant to
each individuals life. It is a source of twinship for each person there. It is a source for a nuanced
and positive mirroring experience between parents and children.
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To conclude this section I wish to highlight the overlap between object relations and
Tillichian theory. Object relations trains our therapeutic lens on the inherent contradictions all
individuals bring to close personal relationships. Tillich was also concerned with these
contradictions. It is relevant to take from this intersection that both theoretical orientations hold
that our estrangement or paranoid positions are not fixed or static but can be conceptualized as
opportunities for reconciliation and growth. The emphasis of this thesis has been to understand
sin in a therapeutic context as an example of how theological self-understanding and
psychodynamic theory might intersect. However, neither a Christian nor a therapist ought to let
their analysis stop at human brokenness. In the conclusion of the next chapter I will therefore
briefly explore the Tillichian understanding of grace in order to consider how it stands as an
equivalent to the therapeutic notions of insight and resolution.
Looking Ahead
In	
  my	
  next	
  chapter	
  I	
  will	
  examine	
  the	
  theory	
  of	
  separation	
  from	
  self,	
  other	
  and	
  the	
  Ground	
  
of	
  all	
  being	
  as	
  explored	
  through	
  Existential	
  Psychotherapy.	
  I	
  will	
  draw	
  heavily	
  from	
  Irvin	
  
Yalom	
  and	
  utilize	
  whenever	
  possible	
  the	
  work	
  of	
  the	
  great	
  existential	
  thinkers	
  Tillich	
  was	
  
participating	
  in	
  discourse	
  with	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  he	
  voiced	
  his	
  theology	
  in	
  those	
  terms.	
  Final	
  
discussion	
  in	
  this	
  subsequent	
  chapter	
  will	
  include	
  thought	
  on	
  the	
  limitation	
  of	
  the	
  theories	
  
discussed	
  toward	
  addressing	
  problems	
  of	
  religious	
  content.
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CHAPTER IV
Existential Psychotherapy and Protestant Thought
Overview
In this chapter I will explore the conceptualization of sin as separation with existential
psychotherapy. I will begin by highlighting the key concepts of existentialism as it has been
integrated into mental health. I will then explore the Tillichian concept of sin as described to the
core domains of existential psychotherapy, freedom, death, isolation and meaninglessness, as
described by Yalom (1980). In this chapter I will begin by lifting up a brief history of
existentialism as a philosophical movement, before considering its influence on psychotherapy. I
will aim to name and highlight those instances in which the three strains named below surface
within and influence subsequent psychotherapeutic approaches.
Existentialism Key Concepts
The existential school of psychiatry has three main branches, based on different
aspects of its philosophical fathers. The first based on Husserl, emphasizes the
phenomenological reduction; Karl Jaspers worked in this tradition, which formed the
mainstream of Continental psychiatry for decades. The second, resting on early
Heidegger, emphasized the existential structure of each individual’s world; here
[Ludwig] Binswanger made his mark. The third, building on the late Heidegger, centered
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itself on the importance of authenticity for the understanding of persons; Sartre belonged
to this approach, along with assorted others such as Laing and Erich Fromm” (Ghaemi,
2001, p. 9-10).
Karl Jaspers (1886- 1969) is credited for widening the clinical lens psychiatry trains on
patient behavior and symptomology. He “adopted Husserl's notions of intuition, description, and
presuppositionlessness, transforming them when necessary in order to serve the investigations of
the psychopathologist” (Wiggins & Schwartz, 1997, pp. 15-36). One can see how this would
have been a paradigmatic stylistic shift from traditional Freudian method. The traditional
orientation rested on natural observation and scientific methodology, however, there were many
practitioners restless with the inadequacies of scientific positivism. Now the clinician is invited
to involve themselves more fully in the reduction and description of things (Wiggins, Schwartz,
1997).
Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) is thought by many to have been the most noteworthy
psychiatrist working from the phenomenology orientation (du Plock, 1996,pp. 29-61). Highly
influenced by Martin Heidegger’s generative work Being and Time (Heidegger,
1927/1962). Binswanger worked to integrate ontology into psychotherapy. Like others before
him, he wasn’t content with the categories of self and other. He wanted to explore self in relation
to the world around. The type of analysis he advocated became known as Daseinanalysis. It is
named after the term dasein, the German word for being there that Heidegger applied to his
work on being (du Plock, 1996, pp. 29-61).
Both R.D. Laing (1927-1989) and Erich Fromm (1900-1980) also draw from the same
stream of philosophical influence and have at times garnered criticism for straying too far from
the natural sciences (Miller, G. 2006). Laing (1927-1989) was an accomplished author with an
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extensive philosophical knowledge that informed his ideas on reading, writing, and
interpretation. Laing argued that psychiatry should be modeled on skillful textual exegesis rather
than scientific explanation. The exegesis of a psychotic’s words and actions is difficult, he infers,
because the impoverishment of our experience cuts us off from the sense that lies within seeming
madness. Like philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Laing therefore criticizes the way in which
the natural sciences have invalidated subjective experience. He consequently employs a rhetoric
designed to disclose with renewed vigor its complexity, variety and reality. Laing fails, however,
to find an alternative to scientific reason: experience, in his weakest work, is an irrational realm
of mystical and self-validating certainty that closely parallels Heidegger’s later accounts of
Being.( Miller, G., 2006, p.1). This period of discourse exposed the classical fiction of pure
empiricism in psychoanalytic work; a delusion that still draws sharp criticism today.
Existential Psychotherapy “holds that [human] drives or dynamisms, whatever one calls
them, can be understood only in the context of the structure of existence of the person we are
dealing with” (May, 1958). Existentialist thought was initiated by several notable philosophers
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries including Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich
Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Karl Jaspers. There is great
variance among them, however their approach to the work and problems of philosophy all begin
with the experience of being-in-the-world as women and men. Rooted in this foundation are
many of the concepts central to existential thought.
However a description of the context in which existentialist thought first took root has
much to do with the development of this theoretical perspective and what it rejected. Soren
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a philosopher, scholar and theologian of the 19th century.
Kierkegaard’s motives were rooted in his dissatisfaction with the philosophy and theology of his
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time. He disliked the narrow positivist language of rationalism and found the religious dogmatics
purporting that God could be comprehended fully and directly by humankind at odds with his
own faith and intellect.
As Kierkegaard and other intellectuals began to further question the fundamentals of the
then predominant philosophy. Early existential thought challenged essentialist ideas of human
kind’s supposed nature. It reopened the mind-body problem, challenging the Cartesain
conceptualization of dualism, offering instead the idea of monism which held that mind and body
cannot be divided into separate states of matter (Wiggens, Schwartz, 1997, pp. 15-36).
These foundational concepts required existentialist thinkers to uncover new terms on
which to philosophize if they were to remain in any kind of discourse at all with western thought.
These new terms were articulated through phenomenology. The teachings of Edmund Husserl
drove a new kind of systematic approach to philosophical discourse (Willis, 2001). These terms
indicated that the meaning of things was made in the eye of the beholder. All knowing of things
is subjective and constructed in the perception of the subject.
Phenomenology wants to slow the researcher down and hold her or his gaze on
the phenomenon itself- the lived-experience of some activity, seeking not to locate it an
abstract matrix by saying how its abstracted structure might be similar to others, but
rather to illumine its specific quality as an experience (Willis, 2001, p. 19).
We will now turn attention from this summary of the early philosophical context of the
advent of existentialism to its key concepts. The aim will be to introduce how these concepts
have influenced existential psychotherapy.

Key Concepts
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The terrain of the philosophy of existence is vast; rather than attempt to offer full
accounting of existential concepts I will highlight those most relevant to its course toward
psychotherapy and mental health. Perhaps the most foundational and poignant concept of
existentialism is in fact, a non-concept. That is to say a rejection of humankind’s most basic
conceptualizing. The conceptualizing of being. This philosophy teaches that being is not a
concept. Instead, being is a phenomenon. To treat being as a concept is to shrink down our
openness for understanding the phenomenology of being. The great Christian philosopher and
theologian Soren Kierkegaard provided rich antecedent thought for the concept of
phenomenology. He asserted that we cannot know existence through concepts and abstractions,
it is too particular. It must be explored through the structures of subjective experience (Yalom,
1980, p. 8). This line of inquiry was more formally introduced to the world in the later work of
Edmund Husserl, an early existential philosopher and professor to many notable students
including Martin Heidegger.
Phenomenology is concerned with the first hand experience of a subject. The individual
receivership of every human being is the starting point for phenomenology. The seeing, hearing,
feeling, desiring, thinking, and intentionality that compose one’s experience of the world are the
proper descriptors of phenomenology. It sounds simple enough, but
Husserl came to believe that the scrutiny of the structure and contents of our
conscious experiences was inhibited and deeply distorted by the manner of our
engagement with our experience in ordinary life, where our practical concerns, folk
assumptions, and smattering of scientific knowledge all got in the way of a pure
consideration of experience as it is given to us” (Nath, 2011, p 9).

	
  

57

Another key existential concept is that of facticity. This can be described as aspects of
experience an individual has taken up throughout their lives. It can include particularities of
one’s birth and early communal experiences as well as family, time, physical appearance and
spoken language. It can be described on parallel to the psychodynamic concept of person-insituation. However it also concerned with the way we are perceived, or the way we believe
others perceive us. Facticity bears further psychological weight when described by existentialists
like Sartre, as the basis from which free choice is enacted by an individual. Sartre puts forth the
idea that an individual is in a constant state of reckoning with their facticity. Each of us
acquiesces to certain limitations of our facticity, at other times each of us endeavor to transcend
these limitations. (Sartre, 1946)
Another hallmark existentialist concept is that of the absurd. There are no better words
to capture this dictum than that of the celebrated author playwright, Albert Camus. In his oft
cited play The Myth of Sisyphus he penned the following “the absurd is born out of confrontation
between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world”(Camus, 1955). The world’s
indifference to our suffering, to the suffering of others, is so abhorrent to us our lives are
conditioned by the struggle with it. Existentialism proposes that our struggle with meaningless
and the absurd sources all manner of malcontent and despair, anxiety and unhappiness. It
supposes that we get up to all kinds of things in order to weather this hostility, and that we move
between our private or individual protestations and a resigned attempt to cope with it.
Another key concept of existentialism that travels well toward psychology is the idea that
existence precedes essence.
A person is born a blank slate; humanity has no universal, predetermined
principles or ethics common to all of mankind. Since no preformed essence or definition
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exists of what it means to be human, a person must form his/her own conception of
existence by asserting control of and responsibility for his/her actions and choices.
Consequently, a human being gains his/her essence through individual choices and
actions. It is solely through the process of living that one defines one’s self (Forish, 2007,
p.14).
This may be one of the more popularly exported ideas into social work education. When
we work with a client we are tasked with the challenge to always bear in sight, as best we can,
that client’s subjective truth. Never entirely possible we still strain to dimly perceive the truth as
described by the client. Another aspect of this existential legacy is that as social workers we rely
on bio-psycho-social assessments. These assessments are at best, and at heart, a deconstruction
of the hierarchical values and their hidden manifestations in the life of a client. This is a fitting
segue into the manner in which existentialism became a therapeutic approach.
From Existential Philosophy to Mental Health Practice in the United States
As the existential approach caught the attention and invited the participation of
social activists and theorists around continental Europe, it also caught the attention of many
prominent psychiatrists in Europe and the United States. “An emerging group of European
existentialist thinkers, who were trained as psychoanalysts broke with Freud’s dogmatic model
of the mind (McInerney, 2013).
One of the first Freudian analysts to break existential trail was Ludwig Binswanger.
Binswanger enjoyed a longstanding collegial friendship with Freud and correspondence with
Heidegger. A scholar of Husserl and highly influenced by Heidegger, Binswanger is credited for
initiating Daseinanalysis (Condrau, 2013). Dasein, is the German word for being there, and it
had become a meaningful Heideggarian term for those involved in existential discourse.
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Eventually Daseinanalysis became its own psychotherapeutic approach for working with clients.
Daseinanalysis is concerned with seeing before or even rather, than explaining (Condrau, 2013).
Another prominent acolyte of existential psychologist was Rollo May. May was a
lifelong friend and highly influenced by Tillich. One of his seminal works The Courage to
Create (1975) is titled in honor of Tillich’s The Courage to Be (Condrau, 2000). May was born
in Ohio educated in New York, Ohio and California in the areas of theology, philosophy and
psychology. He spent his career practicing in the United States. Rollo May influenced Irvin
Yalom who underwent his own analysis under him (Loye, 2004). May was interested in the
period of transition the country was in during the seventies. He was critical of what he saw in the
practice of psychotherapy as heightened focus on the self and the prevalence of methods and
approaches he felt were gimmicks (May, 1975, p.1) One reason existentially driven
psychotherapeutic approaches could have gained popularity in the United States is that scholars
like May were interested in finding ways for the practice of psychotherapy to be less balkanized
(May, 1975).
It is, perhaps, Yalom who most thoroughly incorporated existential concerns into the field
of mental health. Existential psychotherapy is described by Yalom as an orientation for dynamic
therapy based on an individual’s confrontation with the givens of existence. Yalom describes the
givens of existence as “ certain ultimate concerns, certain intrinsic properties that are a part, and
an inescapable part of the human being’s existence in the world (Yalom, 1980, p.6).
In his defining 1980 work Existential Psychotherapy, Yalom grounds these givens in a systemic
approach framework. The approach seeks to uncover for an individual the ultimate concerns that
undergird the anxieties of everyday life. These ultimate concerns can be accessed through
therapeutic encounter under the right conditions. The conditions, as articulated by Yalom are
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“solitude, silence, time and everyday distractions with which each of us fills his or her
experiential world” (Yalom, 1980, p. 330). Existential psychotherapy seeks to reveal underlying
or ultimate truths by dedicating therapeutic attention to them.
In the last few decades modern psychoanalysis has moved away from the existential
tradition (Ghaemi, 2001). However there is a useful body of thought from the tradition that
informs the practice of contemporary clinicians, often referred to as a relational approach
(Ghaemi, 2001). In addition, the scholarly website existential therapy.com displays a welcome
and introduction that uses existential and depth psychology interchangeably, and links them with
Jungian approaches, Gestalt therapy and any type of current relational approach. How then, does
this kind of psychotherapy relate to the Tillichian formulation of sin, and work with religious
clients?
Freedom and Separation from Self
Deeply embedded in individual freedom is responsibility. Existential psychotherapy
asserts that this truth is one of the greatest sources for angst and anxiety in our lives. It also
charges us with the knowledge that freedom and responsibility can offer myriad opportunities for
change, healing and growth. Existential freedom differs from political freedom in that it relates
to psychological freedom as opposed to political or social freedom (Condrau, 1998). The theory
of existential freedom and responsibility holds that one (such as a client or a therapist) must work
ceaselessly toward self awareness. Through self awareness we can hope to alter many of the
seemingly immovable forces on our life experience. The responsibility on the individual is that
they are creating the world as they inhabit it. This can be terrifying and our terror at it can feed
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into all manner of defenses. Yalom defines these as “clinical manifestations of responsibility
avoidance”(Yalom, 1980, p. 223-230).
No therapist goes through a day of work without encountering several examples of
responsibility avoiding defenses. The more common ones: compulsivity, displacement of
responsibility to another, denial of responsibility (innocent victim, losing control), avoidance of
autonomous behavior and, decisional pathology” (Yalom, 1980, p. 224).
While a religiously minded Protestant client could be resistant to the jargon of
psychotherapy or the philosophical language of existentialism, she may be comfortable
understanding her dilemmas through the familiar lens of faith. Thankfully, it is no stretch to
identify aspects of what Tillich calls separation from self present in each of the defenses Yalom
names. Because a Protestant Christian may take humanity’s essential separation from God as a
given she may be open to considering the implications of this separation in her own life.
The avoidance of personal responsibility can become a way of life, a way of life that
keeps one far away from self awareness. Without self awareness a client cannot live an authentic
life or in terms of Tillich, reconcile with themselves (Tillich, 1950). Consider a client whose
distress is related to not making a major decision in their life for fear that it would be a bad one,
or the wrong one. The avoidance of the decision itself can trouble a client greatly arresting them
in their tracks as they fail to choose a course for themselves. Helping a client see such paralysis
as contradictory to reunion with her own best self could be healing.
Death and Separation from Self, Other and the Ground of all Being
Tillich charged that to fully exist or live, one must confront non-being or death. What
does it mean when a religious person, a Protestant Christian, is experiencing fear of death?
Liberal Protestantism promises the grandest reunion at death, the reunion with the Ground of all
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being. Yet many religious people who believe in these claims, or some kind of personal version
of them still struggle throughout their lives with death related anxieties. Death will come for the
ones we love and death will come for all of us. Before physical death there will be symbolic
death and this too will pursue the healthiest among us.
Tillich, in the legacy of Kierkegaard, encourages us to make peace with the fact we
cannot possess all knowledge. Existential psychotherapy compels us to this understanding also.
A Liberal Protestant is indoctrinated to accept the unknowability of God. This acceptance of
unknowablility is a parallel to the unknowability of death. Yalom offers great discussion of the
ways in which human beings manifest the avoidance of death. He describes the heroic rescuer
who can be internal or external. This underground conviction can be so strong that a person
unconsciously believes they will not die (Yalom, 1980 p.129). Yalom also writes about another
aspect of death denial that existential writers have commented on frequently over the decades.
The aspect of not fully living, as if this were a protective factor against death (Yalom, 1980).
Yalom names attempting to “merge with a dominant or powerful other,” “hero and rescuer”
fantasies and “compulsive workaholism” as defences enacted against death that can actually
restrict fullness of life (Yalom, 1980, p. 122-135).
Consider the links of this position to many of the symptoms of depression and anxiety.
The client who refuses to engage in relationships or who refuses to set and pursue goals, or take
even marginal risks of failure in their lives could be seen as having an underlying death anxiety.
Each of these potential failure can gesture implicitly and boldly toward death. The ending of
loving relationships, failing to achieve a goal or losing the most hoped for result of some human
venture are all, by existential thinking, symbolic of death for one inclined to construe it that way.
Tillich reminds us that individuals participate in the creation of what is symbolic for them.

	
  

63

Clients with heightened death anxiety tread on a highly symbolic landscape, bringing to mind the
old wise words, all anxiety is death anxiety.
Death, in its finiteness compels a worldview that effects human beings differently. If
death terror is too great it can call one away from life and into a shallow existence at great
emotional cost. However, a certain amount of awareness of death throughout life is seen as a
good thing. The finiteness that causes some to want to protect themselves can serve as a catalyst
to being for others. The idea is that our very awareness of the inescapable expiration of a perfect
spring day, our dearest intimate relationships, our very bodies and thoughts, is what allows us to
fully experience being. This is what Tillich points to in his seminal existential work The Courage
to Be. Yalom expressed a similar assertion:
The concept of death plays a crucial role in psychotherapy because it plays a
crucial role in the life experience of each of us. Death and life are interdependent: though
the physicality of death destroys us, the idea of death saves us. Recognition of death
contributes a sense of poignancy to life, provides a radical shift of life perspective, and
can transport one from a mode of living characterized by diversions, tranquilization, and
petty anxieties to a more authentic mode (Yalom, 1980, p. 111).
Christian religious life has much to say about death. Protestant Christian religious life has
offered adherents vastly differing perspectives on death. The spectrum holds within it concepts
of damnation and retribution for the laundry list of wrongdoing added up over a lifetime as well
as promises of eternal peace. Protestant faith can teach that no sin will go unpunished or teach
that there is no way for a human being not to sin and that we are offered forgiveness of sin or
grace. Both faith and existential psychotherapy recognize the tension, the sometimes ordered
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feeling contingence between the finite, and the infinite. One cannot exist without the other, the
infinite require the finite and the finite, the infinite to exist.
Isolation and The Separation from Self, Other and the Ground of all Being
The existential understanding of isolation places it as a core determinant in our life
experience. Existential isolation recognizes the day to day feelings of loneliness that can
overtake us from time to time, i.e., I have too few good women friends whom I can laugh with
and relate to meaningfully. Existential isolation proposes a floor beneath this one, i.e., even if I
had more time to devote to cultivating rewarding friendships, I would hold part of myself back
and not be completely open to these relationships, I would condition these relationships with
factors curtailing intimacy. Existential isolation refers to the foundational isolation that
undergirds all loneliness, referred to by Yalom as separation from the world (Yalom, 1980).
There is striking similarity between the conceptualization of foundational isolation as
separation from the world, and the Tillichian conceptualization of our foundational separation
from the Ground of all Being (Tillich, 1950). How are separation from the world and separation
from the Ground of all Being similar? Perhaps the former is more on the metaphysical side and
the latter is more theistic. But both conceptualizations see isolation structurally as vertical
systems that manifest the deep experience of human aloneness into the surface feelings and
behaviors that might be part of a client’s presenting issues.
A therapist working with a client experiencing isolation and its attendant grief will find
remarkable likenesses between these particular theological and psychological bodies of thought.
Perhaps more so than in the other theories there are extremely similar conclusions. Existential
psychotherapy wants therapy to move the isolated client toward more fulfilling relationships with
others. Yet, neither existential psychotherapy nor liberal protestantism will ever promise freedom
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from the pain of isolation. Both hold isolation as a condition of existence that will be
experienced even by those whose lives are utterly engaged in meaningful relationships. “No
relationship can eliminate isolation. Each of us is alone in existence. Yet aloneness can be shared
in such a way that love compensates for the pain of isolation” (Yalom, 1980, p 335). The
existential psychotherapeutic approach encourages the client toward recognition that each of us
are alone, each of must work to negotiate that aloneness, the other is not merely a device for
doing this though. The other is also a being negotiating their own isolation.
Despite such significant areas of resonance and overlap, each of the comparisons I have
lifted up present unique challenges and do not always line up neatly with Tillich’s understanding
of either sin and its implications, the work therapists are tasked with, or the perspectives we are
trained to see through.
For instance, in the case of existentialist thought, the idea that loneliness is a condition of
existence can be understood to sit in tension with training that is focused on secure attachment
histories. Tillich, Yalom, Rollo May, Sartre, all believe that we are captive to a most
fundamental aloneness that cannot be totally assuaged in our lives regardless of the quality of our
early relationships. This should not, but could, limit the therapeutic attention given to that
history. The existential approach may minimize a client’s actual facility for pursuing and
maintenance of quality relationships. It is still attachment history that will equip them to do so, or
point toward the relational injuries in need of healing for stronger relationships.
Tillich’s concept of tri-fold estrangement holds within it extraordinary contradiction when it
comes to isolation. It is the task of humankind to overcome the separation between us, yet this to
do this entirely is utterly outside our ability (Baker, 2010). And similarly, Yalom asserts that we
must accept our fundamental isolation in order to turn lovingly to others (Yalom, 1980). The
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abyss surrounds each one of us, however “ a great relationship [sic] breaches the barriers of
solitude and subdues its strict law, and throws a bridge from self-being to self-being across the
abyss of dread of the universe (Buber, 1965, as cited in Yalom, 1980, p. 393). Theologically and
philosophically the concept of isolation as a permanent, immoveable given may work just fine,
theology is tasked in part with naming our brokenness, its purview: our fallen state. Philosophy
with its in endless interest in riddles, seems like theology, content to sit with the paradox.
However, this is a particularly challenging contradiction to work within therapeutically. Neither
theology or philosophy as fields are known for great interest in making themselves especially
accessible to people. Therapy on the other hand, needs to concern itself with accessibility.
Meaninglessness and the Separation from Self, Other and the Ground of all Being
In the section of his book dedicated to existential psychotherapy entitled
Meaninglessness, Yalom differentiates between meaning and purpose. He writes “meaning and
purpose have different connotations. Meaning refers to sense, or coherence. A search for
meaning implies a search for coherence” (Yalom, 1980, p.423-424). When any of us are caught
in the teeth of meaninglessness it can give rise to the deepest despair. As contemporary clinicians
working with religious clients we should note the ontic overtones to any dissolution of meaning
in a client’s life. A crisis of meaning in a client’s life encompasses the threat of nonbeing.
Experiencing oneself as having no meaning to our lives is as experiencing symbolic nonbeing.
In his 1952 book The Courage to Be, Paul Tillich wrote that “we are in danger of spiritual nonbeing” (Tillich, 1952, p.59). He sought to categorize anxiety into:
The three directions nonbeing threatens being. Nonbeing threatens man’s ontic
self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate absolutely in terms of death. It threatens
man’s spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of
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meaninglessness. It threatens man’s moral self-affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt,
absolutely in terms of condemnation (Tillich, 1952, p. 59).
Tillich wants us to identify the natural state of emptiness we all must wrestle with as
rooted in our estrangement from God or the Ground of all Being. He says that our anxiety is
“aroused by the loss of a spiritual center, however symbolic and indirect, to the question of the
meaning of existence” (Tillich, 1952, p.60). Tillich’s assertions regarding meaninglessness offer
very little that is particular enough to translate therapeutically. However, existential
psychotherapy seems to pick up the concept and offer a terra firma from which to orient oneself
to work with clients. Existential psychotherapy sees living a life of meaning as a healthy and
brave rebellion to meaninglessness and the tolls it will take on us all. Any therapist can work
with a client to identify the fertile ground in that client’s life from which to draw meaning.
Religious clients are primed for this exploration. Already engaged in a give and take with
questions of meaning in life these clients are familiar with the idea that meaning is sought, as
opposed to, or as well as, created. The distinction between meaning making and meaning
seeking is noteworthy for a secular therapist approaching from an existential orientation
(www.existetnial -therapy.com). It would be a great limitation to work with a religious client on
their experience, or lack of meaning in life and not hew back toward the ultimate. The concept of
the Ground of all being is open and abstract enough for the secular therapist to enter with the
religious client.
For Tillich the Ground of all being was “associated being with feminine aspects of
divinity” and symbolic concept for the ultimate (Stenger & Stone, 2002). He states that the
concept implies life-giving and nurturing and suggests a more intimate tie between creator and
created than traditional metaphors of God the Father imply (Stenger & Stone, R., 2002).
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Regardless of whether we consider them today to be representative of feminine virtues or not,
therapy can focus on these themes in a client’s life toward recognizing and living with meaning
and purpose. Having touched upon that notion, it is interesting to compare the notion of grace or
reconciliation in Tillich and the psychodynamic theories we have explored.
The preceding section highlighted a theoretical exchange between trifold separation and
the existential psychotherapeutic domains of freedom, death, isolation and meaninglessness. We
noted that while this kind of theory offers many points of connection to sin as separation there
does exist a fundamental tension between the philosophical roots of existential psychotherapy
and the theological orientation of sin as separation. And we gave consideration to how religious
clients may be primed by their faith observance for robust engagement with an existentialist
approach.
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CHAPTER V
Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion
This essay has demonstrated the complicated history between social work as it is
practiced in the United States and religion. I have shown that at the field’s formal inception, it
was coupled with religious institutions and their various missions. We trace enormous good to
the early work done by religiously driven organizations, however, our contemporary vantage
includes the exclusivist, problematic appropriation of early charitable resources, and the weight
of religionist judgment. The essay highlighted the period of uncoupling between religion and
social work as well as the later renewed interest in spirituality.
This theoretical work has utilized seminal theology from one of the United States’ most
esteemed theologians and the theory from progenitors of object relations and existential
psychotherapy. The theoretical orientations of object relations and existential psychotherapy
were compared to and contrasted with the liberal Protestant conceptualization of sin as a state of
separation. The psychodynamic theories were explored both in terms of content explicitly
relevant to religion and in terms of divergence from the theological thought.
Klein holds that in infancy we find ourselves at war with our dependency (Klein, 1937).
As a person ages in contemporary America this conundrum is exacerbated because we are taught
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that we are self made individuals whose primary purpose is to exercise our own independence.
We deny, distrust or even loathe our own contingence. All the while, as the theologian Stanley
Hauerwas snidely notes, the mark of our dependence is stamped right into our flesh. What is a
belly button if not a sign of our contingence (Hauerwas, 2001, p.99) It is good for clinicians to
recognize both the impossibility of true self-sufficiency, and the manner in which our culture
often presents such a state as an ideal to which our clients ought to aspire.
Contemporary clinicians are inheritors of the relational paradigm and social work
compels an ongoing examination of person-in-situation. We must then ask ourselves, how does
self in relation fare in our excessively individualistic society? In a 1984 study (Hofstede, 1984)
looking at the dominant value system of 50 modern countries, the United States topped the list in
the domain of individualism versus collectivism (Alpern, 2001). Such an extreme ethos has a
cost to a society. Our individualism is pathological. The pillars of individualism i.e. narcissism,
competition, detachment are antagonistic to the building blocks of human relationships. Social
theorists have long recognized the effects of this alienating individualism (Rotenberg, 1999).
Such an environment inevitably contributes to the breakdown of our attachments (Alpern, 2001).
It isn't that we're punished for living in such a state, rather that living in such a state is
punishment. If we understand that excessive individualism has negative impact on people,
families, society, then we also understand that the adaptations we make to our dysfunctional
systems are likely to cause inner conflict. If the context of contemporary American society
reflects back our paranoid-schizoid fears, then we as social workers ought to take avid interest in
the ways people resist full assimilation into these anxieties.
For many religious people, their faith tradition stands as a means for reconciliation of
individual and collective need. For their adherents, faith communities can act as the expanded
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holding environment. The holding environment introduced by second generation object relation
theoretician Donald Winnicott in 1965, has something to offer us throughout our lives and is a
precondition for psychological well-being. Winnicott proposed the holding environment first
provided by our mother or primary care giver is expanded over development. The idea is that for
our individual need there exists an individual or a family or community that can answer the need.
For the holding environment to hold the state of separation is reconciled. There is great
symmetry here with the Tillichian concept of sin, but with a different starting point. Sin as
separation begins with separation from the ground of all being, experienced as separation from
self and expressed as separation from other. Both understandings of a human being point toward
the great promise reconciliation holds for a suffering individual. Both understandings see
reconciliation with other as necessary to individual healing. Object relations theories or any
psychodynamic theoretical branch, are not tasked, as existential theology is, with resolving
ontological or soteriological problems, however a therapist working with a religious client
should attend to the corollaries.
In this final chapter I will discuss limitations in methodology and author biases,
implications for the social work field and possible directions for future exploration.
How did the Research Work?
In my thesis I have shown that Melanie Klein’s work on the crises of infancy and the
reparative expressions that follow, offers a symmetry with the Tillichian idea of separation from
other and the Ground of all Being. They both hold that shot right through our estrangement from
the Ground of all being as Tillich would have it, or from our primary caretaker as Klein theorizes,
is the pull toward reconciliation or reparation. This is a force that cannot be ignored and a force
that is embedded with promise and opportunity in the language of Klein and the language of
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Tillich. Both Klein and Tillich name the state of reconciliation or reparation as impossible to
sustain, we will realize it only fleetingly. Human existence does not permit the mastery of these
forces. Yet while we may not know in full, we may better know, enter more fully into and even
make way for these phenomena.
It was Heinz Kohut’s conceptualization that early object relation injuries can be healed
when twinship, mirroring and idealization can flourish in the supportive context of therapy. Both
of these theories echo a likeness to Tillich’s thought that estrangement bears the possibility of
reunion. Both of these theories also share a fundamental starting point with Tillich, that is that
these separations, from self, other and the world, or the Ground of all being, cause individuals
emotional distress in their lives. Kohut’s work on self psychology insists that the self is
communally created, sustained, injured and healed. The tripolar self structure relies on twinship,
mirroring and idealization to soothe the pain and distress of the self’s separations. Their shield
and supply is vital to wellbeing and essential for healing. This is highly relevant for the therapist
working with a religious client.
The conceptualization of tri-fold estrangement is existential. It extends naturally into
the four domains of existential psychotherapy elucidated by Yalom; death, isolation, freedom
and meaning hold requirements to our existence. Throughout our lives we are responding to
these requirements in some manner or another, consciously or not. Tillich believed that theology
resting on revelation, experience and symbol responds to the calls made by human existence
(Tillich, 1973)
The more one becomes familiar with object relations, the more expansive its purview
becomes. The depth to which an other is taken in to the self cannot truly be set to language, even
through the most inspired rhetoric. The longing for reparation with the world, as Klein describes
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it, calls our clinical gaze first to the primary infant care giver dyad and then to the human, world
dyad (Klein, 1948). Object relations theory begins in the particular but also transcends it,
reaching toward the universal. In doing so it avails itself to dialogue with theories of religion.
Existential psychotherapy offers us secular language to approach religion. This alone
makes it a valuable and far reaching tool to engage religious clients. This approach avoids the
paradigm of seeking to prove or disprove a given religion’s truth claims. It places highest
importance on close attention to the client experience of being.
Both object relations and existential psychotherapy have an openness to cross
disciplinary application. They both lent themselves well to consideration of liberal protestant
clients. The idea of our primary motives being fueled by our struggle for and with human
connection reaches toward the ontological. The primary focus of existential psychotherapy
organizes client experience around themes of ultimate concern. In essence it is spiritual. All this
is to say that these theories worked well for this research because they are already in dialogue
with human experience in a manner sufficient to encompass religion.
Implications for Field of Social Work
The essay points out that secular therapists practicing in the U.S. will have clients who
carry religious minded outlooks. We must be prepared to enter into a curious, respectful and
learned dialogue with these clients and the content they bring. Given the diversity of religions
practiced in the U.S. and the variety of interpretations within each particular religion it is highly
unlikely that even the most must studious therapist could familiarize herself with the doctrine
and truth claims of every faith they may encounter.
Fortunately, such expertise is unnecessary. To do the religious client justice a therapist
does not need to know every arcane corner of that client’s religious tradition. After all even the
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most orthodox religious clients will experience their faith in a relatively limited, individual and
particular way. Moreover, therapists are called to work with women and men, not doctrine and
dogma.
However to do justice to the religious client, the therapist cannot ignore the power of
religion as a source and producer of meaning in the client’s life. Further, a basic understanding of
the particular claims of a particular religious tradition can unearth points of fruitful connection
between religious doctrine and psychotherapeutic theory. When a therapist who is trained to
think in psychodynamic terms serves a client who is shaped by a particular religious outlook
such connections can open new and promising terrain, areas of conversation and healing that
might be unavailable if such intersections went unexplored.
My hope is that this exploration might serve to suggest that other such intersections are
also possible. One might consider how Protestant understandings of redemption and forgiveness
intersect with theories of addiction treatment, or how the Hindu understanding of karma relates
to Freud’s oedipal theory. The possibilities are endless. The time to envisage the possibilities of
theoretical exchange is when you learn the theory. If graduate programs explored concepts of
theoretical exchange between theology and psychodynamic theory, students would be better
equipped to use the theory they have learned when they practice. This kind of exploration in
graduate programs would offer the experience of using the theory in actual practice. Repeating
the isolated concepts of object relations, or other approaches, back to a professor regarding a
case study demonstrates a student’s grasp of that theory. This is an appropriate first step, but it
could be taught with greater flexibility. The way to learn that flexibility is to try it out in relation
to other frameworks. To work psychodynamically means to work dynamically. The theories are
not static, and we should resist the temptation to freeze them in rigid, fixed interpretations. Nor
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should we cede the richness and vitality of classic psychodynamic theory to a bygone era. As
contemporary psychotherapists these theories are our greatest inheritance. Far from fragile, these
theories, have borne the grit of ten million maladies and can certainly have productive interface
with many pieces of theology. They are designed to be in conversation with the world of our
clients, right here in the present moment.
Directions for Future Research
In her work on the intersection between pastoral counseling and theology the scholar
Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger drives home the intersectionality between faith and psychology.
“For those who are open to God in faith, all the knowledge of other objects mediates the
knowledge of God himself” (Price as quoted in Hunsinger, 1995, p. 54 ). Hunsinger reminds us
that individuals imbue their internal objects with the meaning they carry (1995). As that activity
is altered through therapy, so too may be an individual’s internal God representation. In fact, the
God image one carries, which is often influenced by characteristics of early object relation
experience, encompasses both what that experience may have offered and what it may have
lacked. “Just as psychoanalysis provides an opportunity for the reworking of one’s internal
objects, for redescribing the past such that a new relation is achieved with parents and other
significant people, so similar opportunities exist for the God image” (Hunsinger, 1995. p.57).
When we enter into the therapeutic dyad with religious clients we partner with them in
their striving for reparation with other and with self. Are we to ignore their experience of the
Ground of all being even as we attempt to facilitate their move toward wholeness? We are not
tasked with the same objectives as the ordained pastoral counselor. It is not our purview to
counsel on God. However our stance cannot and should not be one of passive neglect or
intentionally ignoring such meaningful forces in an individual’s life. Psychodynamic training
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does offer opportunity for respectful exploration of religious meaning for a client from a secular
position. We are especially prepared by our trained attention to the inner object experience of
object relations theory. Guided by concepts such as Winnicott’s (1966) transitional space, we
recognize the phenomenon of experience which cannot rightfully be assigned to wholly
subjective or wholly objective realms. This area should be “exempt from the normal
requirements of reality testing” (Hunsinger, 1995, p.39). It should not be exempt from the
meaningful alliance an individual seeks to build with their therapist.
Freud believed that a person’s God representation was fixed, arrested in the paternal
experience of early childhood (Rizzuto, 1979). But as psychodynamic theory has advanced
through the years this perception has evolved. It is now understood as far less constant than
Freud believed (Rizzuto, 1979). In fact it is likely to shift when object relations are re-worked
(Rizzuto, 1979). Object relations theory opens us up to the liminal sphere of experience religion
can be located in. The place Winnicott referred to as “outside, inside and at the border”
(Meissner, 1984). Existential psychotherapy offers language for the secular therapist to speak
with a client on their experience of ultimate concerns. Both offer powerful tools to help partner
with the religiously troubled individual.
This theoretical thesis has demonstrated that concepts familiar to psychotherapists can be
employed to help understand the client experience of religion. In particular, the concept of sin as
a separation from self, other and the Ground of all Being can be used toward working with a
client from a liberal protestant background.
Based on this thesis, implications for the field of social work include more work done on
the use of theology and psychodynamic theory. It would be helpful to hear about casework where
secularly trained clinicians work cross disciplinarily with clients. All theory and theology is at
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some remove from actual people, it would be good to hear about the actual experience of being
with clients who are invited to share their faith experience in the context of therapy. Moreover a
survey of social workers who have had religion come up would be useful. The questions of what
themes most often arose with these clients could drive future knowledge building projects.
I chose the Tillichian conceptualization of sin because it speaks so directly to human
experience as I understand it through psychodynamic theory. Psychodynamic theory is
concerned with being. It borders the ontological and as such will yield rich results when put in
conversation with other ontic frameworks relevant to a client. In fact our own theoretical
perspective comes in to sharp relief when we contrast it to other orientations.
Limitations of Thesis
Throughout this thesis I have focused on particular theology and particular
psychodynamic theories. This was necessary for in depth theoretical exploration of how these
theories do and do not correlate. Exploring these questions in depth requires narrowing the
population to the clients it could meaningfully serve, in this case liberal protestants, or those with
a liberal protestant background. This area of focus excludes many clients, atheist, agnostic and
religious. That fact limits the potential value it may contribute to clinical readership. Another
limit is that secular therapists are not trained in theology and when theological experience or
religious feeling comes into the dyad there may arise a lack of clarity regarding roles. The
clinician will have the added responsibility of tending to that role clarity. It is not appropriate for
a secular clinician to make interpretations or counsel on client conceptualizations of God.
There is further added responsibility for a therapist working with theology and
psychodynamic theory. This is the importance of knowing one’s own transference to religion.
What is our reaction when a client tells us they rely on Jesus for protection or that they rebuke
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the devil? How do we experience in our hearts and minds a client use of the language of sin?
What about a client who believes in God but feels cut off from Her? A client who feels
unmoored from the faith they were raised in and experiences grief over that will elicit varying
responses depending on the clinician. We must know what we think and feel, as best as we can
about religion and religious clients in order to work ethically and with integrity regarding their
personal faith.
For instance, I am a liberal protestant. The lens of liberal Protestantism is my lens. I
regularly note the role my faith life has in how I experience the world around me. I note the
impact it has on my call to social work and the dimension it brings to how I experience clients.
In terms of bias, once a therapist encourages a client’s religion to walk through the door it could
prove difficult for the therapist to keep her own religious convictions at an appropriate distance.
The risk of non-productive counter-transference is high. I know this personally from an
experience I had working as an intern.
A client was referred to me for individual weekly meetings after it was brought to my
supervisor’s attention that she and her family were homeless. She was African American, female,
sixteen years old. Her parents emigrated from Haiti just before her birth. Tina and her family
lived as part of a strongly Haitian identified community and participate actively in a Pentecostal
Haitian church. Tina questioned her sexual orientation which put her in conflict and acrimony
with her mother and step-father.
Tina described the membership of her tight-knit Haitian Christian church as extended
family. The church included twenty to thirty biologically related members as well as “aunties
and uncles” who are family by way of their regional Haitian background.
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Tina relied heavily on the defense of internalization. She regularly stated that “gay people
were sinning” even as she admitted frequent, powerful sexual attraction to other young women.
Her family’s Haitian Pentecostal Christianity taught that these feelings (and thoughts) were
damning. Frequently after proclaiming intense romantic feelings about her friend “T” (a genderqueer female) she would finish by telling me how she believed “gay people were an
abomination.” It seemed too much for Tina to consciously accept her burgeoning identity. It
placed her in a place of direct hostility with her central caretaker from birth, her mother. This
gave way to psychic conflict. Her ego was at times flooded with feelings of worthlessness as she
turned these harsh internalizations inward on herself.
Tina was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder with depressed mood; Tina was troubled
by discord with her environment. However, from my perspective as a Liberal Protestant I could
not help but assess the messages she was receiving from her church and conclude that it was the
environment that was broken, not the client. This proved problematic.
Tina was in the throes of coming to terms with her attraction to other young women. This
was deeply troubling to her because her church taught that homosexuality is sinful. I am also
Christian. An observant, Sunday School teaching, weekly worshiping, pray-at-the-table-beforemeals Christian. But, I am the kind of Christian whose blood runs cold at the thought of gay
people being made to feel anything less than beloved and affirmed in the eyes of God. I belong
to a church that intentionally practices an “extravagant welcome” and whose doctrines hold that
GLBT people reflect the image of God as clearly as do their straight brothers and sisters.
Moreover, to be blunt, my church holds that homophobic Christian churches are distorting God’s
truth.
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On several occasions I noted that in my time with Tina I was subtly maneuvering the
conversation toward the topic of Christianity and homosexuality. Eventually, as she steered the
conversation elsewhere, I realized that I was trying to take care of myself. I was seeking to
address my own longing for a corrective experience. I felt tremendous discomfort listening to a
young person squirm with this issue. I felt guilt about my own membership in a religion that has
been harmful to so many teenagers wrestling with questions of sexual orientation. I wanted to
show Tina that there were others ways to be Christian so that I could sit comfortably with my
own faith.
Eventually I came to believe that by never letting the faith question advance Tina told me
that solving the conundrum of her conservative Christianity and her emerging sexual identity is
not what she needed at this point in her life. It was better for me to honor her resistance. Behind
that resistance lay her internalization of a mother who loved and cared for her. I came to believe
that in order to be intact, she needed the security of her mother’s love above all else. However, if
I had not been careful I could easily have slipped into an altogether different role, one that called
for me to proclaim my own religious truth as superior to that of my client’s. As I said at the
onset of this paper, secular therapists are not clergy-people and we should not pretend to be.
There are many reasons for this, but the first one is that such role confusion could easily be
harmful to our clients.
In Closing
As this thesis moves toward its conclusion it is important to reiterate its aim. While I
hope to have established the fact that there is much ground for a fruitful exchange between a
Tillichian concept of sin and various psychodynamic theories, the goal of my project is more
expansive than this. I have used Paul Tillich’s understanding of the Protestant doctrine of sin in
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dialogue with Klein, other Object Relations theorists and Yalom in an effort to lift up one
example of how to meet a much larger need.
This need, of course, is for secular therapists to be able to hear their religiously observant
clients on their own terms, or in what George Lindbeck might call their particular religious
languages (Lindbeck, 1984). In order to do so it is important for therapists to gain some
familiarity (if not comfort) with the implications of the truth claims of particular religions.
Because these truth claims are not universal or universally similar it would be wise for a therapist
to consider the particular religious perspectives of her clients. If she is working with a
predominantly Catholic population it would be helpful to learn some basic Catholic doctrine. If
she were working with a primarily Buddhist clientele it would make sense to familiarize herself
with Buddhism. My goal has been to suggest how secular therapists might use the insights of the
Object Relations school and existentialist therapy to better meet the needs of their Protestant
Christian clients as an example of what such dialogue might look like. It will, of course, look
different when a therapist uses the insights of the theories that undergird her work to dialogue
with Hinduism or Islam.
It should go without saying that this study is limited by its concern for the religiously
observant. The insights and methods suggested here would be of little help to an avowedly
atheist client. Moreover, they could prove distinctly unhelpful to a client who has intentionally
rejected her or his religious upbringing.
A final observation on the limits of this theoretical thesis is that it is theoretical.
Psychodynamic theory added to a theory of religion means more abstraction, places us perhaps,
more remote from lived experience. Working theoretically means working at a remove that must
be overcome in the relationship. Each and every minute abstraction has its own life in the
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experience of an individual. And so, when we begin with theory we have to work to transcend it
also in order to fully enter into therapeutic encounter.
Both limited and phenomenal, dynamic theory of any kind is enlivened by exchange.
Cross disciplinary efforts will bring into fuller view the wholeness of the people we are working
with. It will promote the client experience of integration. It will contribute to the therapists’
efficacy. It will be healing.
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